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1,	Introduction:	Shame	and	Modern	Writing	
	
Barry	Sheils	and	Julie	Walsh		
	
	It	 is	 not	 uncommon	 for	 the	 opening	 statement	 of	 a	 new	 academic	 work	 to	impress	 upon	 the	 reader	 a	 self-consciousness	 concerning	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 its	very	existence;	to	call	into	question	the	terms	of	its	own	offering	as	if	to	outwit	the	 shame	of	 redundancy	–	of	 not	being	wanted,	 read,	 or	 enjoyed.	 	 	 ‘Given	 the	state	of	the	field,	who	now	needs	a	further	book	on	X,	Y	or	Z?’.	If	such	a	sentiment	is	 familiar,	 so	 too	will	 be	 the	 conviction	with	which	 the	book	 in	 question	 then	answers	 itself:	 ‘it	 is	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	 present	 configuration	 of	 cultural,	political	 or	 economic	 exigencies	 that	 the	 need	 for	 a	 book	 on	 X,	 Y	 or	 Z	 is	most	pressing’.	 With	 a	 prudent	 deployment	 of	 the	 chiasmus,	 the	 author	 has	 let	 us	know	that	she	is	(already)	all-knowing	with	respect	to	the	prospect	of	her	own	exposure	 –	 a	 little	 like	 being	 both	 the	 Emperor	 in	 his	 birthday	 suit,	 and	 the	bystander	who	calls	him	out	on	 it.	 	Might	 it	be	 that	such	a	play	of	modest	self-effacement	 and	 barefaced	 self-advertisement	 has	 a	 special	 resonance	 for	 the	production	of	writing	 from	within	 the	Academy?	As	 the	editors	of	 this	volume,	we	answer	‘yes’.	Two	of	shame’s	constituent	components	–	knowing	and	seeing	–	are	 symptomatically	 heightened	 in	 a	 modern	 university	 system	 in	 which	 the	operations	of	knowledge	production	and	the	directives	of	visibility	–	being	seen	to	know	–	collide.	But	might	 it	also	be	that,	 irrespective	of	 institutional	setting,	the	very	act	of	writing	–	be	it	the	private	diary	entry,	the	functional	to-do	list,	or	the	crafted	and	much	re-drafted	excerpt	of	literary	prose	–	will	inevitably	leave	on	 the	 page	 a	 residue	 or	 trace	 of	 shame?	 	 Again,	 our	 response	 would	 be	affirmative.	And	to	justify	this	double	‘yes’	we	must	address	with	care	the	terms	of	 our	 engagement,	 defending	 the	 contention	 that	 there	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 a	writing	 devoid	 of	 shame,	 but	 also	 allowing	 that	 shameful	writing	 has	 different	modes	through	which	its	histories	and	affective	intensities	interact.		This	 introduction	 provides	 an	 opportunity	 to	 argue	 for	 the	 intrinsic	relation	 between	 shame	 and	 writing,	 while	 also	 reflecting	 on	 the	 pronounced	
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tendency	 in	 the	 contemporary	 moment	 towards	 nominating	 ‘shame’	 as	 a	phenomenon	 worthy	 of	 analysis.	 In	 other	 words	 there	 are	 two	 interleaving	concerns.	 The	 first	 seeks	 to	 identify	 shame	 in	 existing	 writing	 practices	 by	acknowledging	an	economy	of	affective	transfer	between	writer,	reader	and	text,	operating	 in	 excess	 of	 representation.	At	 one	 level	 this	 economy	 is	manifested	through	 the	 anecdotes	 of	 writerly	 subjectivity:	 reflective	 inhibition;	 intense	frustration;	 the	 abjection	of	 the	body	 encountering	 an	 impossible	 task;	 useless	feelings	(common	to	poet	and	bureaucrat)	when	confronted	with	the	empty	page	and	the	command	to	write.	There	are	also	the	humiliations	of	finding	oneself	to	have	been	already	written:	as	well	as	the	errors,	missteps,	and	solecisms	that	slip	from	 the	 pen,	 there	 is	 the	 essential	 reduction	 of	 being	metricized	 and	 forever	more	 ‘on	the	record’.	Yet,	as	we	know	from	the	years	of	 ‘theory’,	such	ordinary	anecdotes	persist	as	textual	figures,	or	deconstructive	aporias	inside	every	work	we	deem	legible.	And,	once	acknowledged,	they	testify	to	more	than	subjectivity,	but	 to	 the	 linguistic	 act	 itself	 and	 the	 force	 of	 expulsion	 required	 by	 even	 the	most	 impersonally	 scientific	 prose.	 What	 Jean-Jacques	 Lecercle	 nominates	 the	‘constitutive	 remainder’	 of	 language,	 the	 endless	 contamination	 of	 word	 and	world,	 and	 the	means	by	which	writing	consistently	 fails	 to	be	an	autonomous	structure	 of	meaning,	 suggests	 an	 important	 point	 of	 apposition	 here:	 namely,	that	 ‘[b]efore	 it	 is	 a	 practice,	 language	 is	 a	 body	–	 a	 body	of	 sounds.’	 Thus	 the	violence	of	 language,	 Lecercle	 emphasizes,	 ‘is	 to	be	 taken	at	 its	most	 literal,	 as	body	 penetrating	 body’.1	The	 sound	 of	writing,	 then,	 beyond	 the	 tip	 tap	 of	 the	keyboard	or	the	scratch	of	the	pen,	is	the	sound	of	a	body	entering	into	relation	with	other	bodies,	where	the	risk	of	shame	is	ubiquitous.2		Our	second	concern	 is	with	 the	descriptive	purchase	of	 the	word	shame	today	when	thinking	about	the	fact	and	force	of	writing-as-exteriorisation.	There	is	little	doubt	that	over	the	last	two	decades	shame	has	been	enjoying	a	period	of	discursive	 prominence,	 both	 within	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 university	 as	 the	subject	of	academic	writing,	and	in	culture	more	broadly	as	a	theme	deserving	of	serious	 attention.	 It	 is	 not	 difficult	 to	 suggest	 several	 reasons	 as	 to	 why	 this	might	have	become	the	case:	(1)	The	ongoing	transformation	of	the	public	sphere,																																																									1	Jean-Jacques	Lecercle,	The	Violence	of	Language.		(London,	Routledge:	1990):	229.	2	‘One	does	not	speak	[or	write]	of	things	or	states	of	affairs,	one	speaks	in	the	midst	of	states	of	affairs	(‘à	même	les	états	de	choses’)’	(Ibid.:	226).	
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and	the	rise	of	so-called	‘identity’	politics,	which	has	been	cast	in	fresh	light	by	the	
internet	and	new	media	forums.3	The	public	space	and	the	people	who	occupy	it	have	further	fragmented,	it	seems,	not	simply	into	political,	but	also	ontological	segregations,	 with	 on-line	 persona	 granted	 a	 means	 of	 addressing	 themselves	beyond	 any	 intended,	 or	 even	 recognizable,	 audience.	 Such	 an	 unprecedented	circulation	of	opinion	has	undoubtedly	made	it	more	difficult	within	the	‘world’	of	 Twitter,	 Facebook,	 Wikileaks	 etc.,	 to	 define	 lines	 of	 trespass.	 Indeed	 it	 can	hardly	be	 ignored	 that	we	are	writing	 this	book	 in	 the	age	of	President	Trump	whose	media	presence,	relying	on	emotional	hyperbole	and	ad	hominem	attacks,	is	 both	 shameful	 and	 shaming,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 surrealistically	 imprecise	(e.g.	 ‘you	 are	 fake	 news’ 4 ).	 It	 is	 this	 imprecision,	 virtually	 obscuring	 an	adjudicated	 object	 of	 interest,	 which	 induces	 in	 his	 opponents	 feelings	 of	shortcoming	before	the	task	of	formulating	a	proportional	response	–	a	response	that	will	 be	 adequately	 seen	 or	 heard	 –	 as	well	 as	 the	 shameful	 temptation	 to	shout-over	 or	 to	 simply	 disavow	 and	 close	 down	 all	 future	 attempts	 at	engagement.	In	this	way	our	understanding	of	the	historical	moment	converges	with	reflection	upon	the	vicissitudes	of	our	affective	lives.	(2)	Theorising	within	
the	 bio-political	 paradigm,	 broadly	 conceived	 according	 to	 Michel	 Foucault’s	
designation	of	a	shift	from	the	politics	of	territorial	sovereignty	to	the	government	
of	populations.5		Though	undoubtedly	the	modern	globalising	university	 is	 itself	an	agent	of	 ‘governance’,	 there	have	been,	within	its	frame,	specifically	through	studies	of	sex,	sexuality,	race,	and	colonialism,	attempts	to	confront	the	shame	of	the	 institution.	 To	 frame	 bio-political	 ordinances	 is	 to	 make	 conspicuous	 that																																																									3	Jon	Ronson’s	popular	book	So	You’ve	Been	Publically	Shamed	(Picador,	2015)	makes	explicit	the	role	 of	 the	 internet	 in	 the	 contemporary	 instrumentalization	of	 shame	as	 a	moral	 tool,	 or	 as	 a	failure	 of	 judicious	 impersonality	 in	 debate.	 In	 this	 volume,	Martin	 Eve	 considers	 the	 how	 the	internet	has	shaped	the	publishing	norms	of	academic	writing.		4	Locatable	as	a	symptom	of	so-called	‘post-truth	politics’,	one	of	Trump’s	signature	declarations	‘you	 are	 fake	 news’,	 brings	 to	mind	 Brian	Massumi’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 ‘affective	means’	 through	which	 Ronald	 Reagan	maintained	 his	 leadership:	 ‘It	 wasn’t	 that	 people	 didn’t	 hear	 his	 verbal	fumbling	 or	 recognize	 the	 incoherence	 of	 his	 thoughts.	 […]	 He	was	 a	 communicative	 jerk.	 […]	Reagan	 transmitted	 vitality,	 virtuality,	 tendency,	 in	 sickness	 and	 interruption.	 […]	 Reagan	was	many	 things	 to	 many	 people,	 but	 always	 within	 a	 general	 framework	 of	 affective	 jingoism.	Confidence	 is	 the	 apotheosis	 of	 affective	 capture.’	 (Brian	 Massumi,	 Parables	 For	 The	 Virtual:	
Movement,	Affect,	Sensation.	Duke	University	Press,	2001:	41-2).	5	Michel	 Foucault,	 Security,	 Territory,	 Population:	 Lectures	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France,	 1977-1978.	Edited	by	Michel	Senellart	and	translated	by	G.	Burchell.	(New	York,	Picador:	2007);	The	Birth	of	
Biopolitics:	 Lectures	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France,	 1978-1979.	 Edited	 by	 Michel	 Senellart	 and	translated	by	G.	Burchell	(London,	Palgrave	Macmillan:	2008).	
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shameful	 line	 between	 those	 bodies	 given	 the	 opportunities	 of	 formation,	 and	those	 rendered	 disposable	 through	 organized	 processes	 of	 representation.	 (3)	
The	 emergence	 of	 the	 Environmental	 Humanities.	 ‘Species	 shame’	 may	 yet	 be	regarded	skeptically	as	a	specifically	Western	pathology,	or	even	as	a	displaced	Malthusian	anxiety	concerning	overpopulation,	but	the	hypothesized	advent	of	a	new	 geological	 epoch	 wherein	 the	 effects	 of	 human	 culture	 are	 said	 to	 have	irremediably	 altered	 the	 planet’s	 ecosystems,	 marks	 an	 important	 paradox	 of	university	discourse.	As	an	epoch	commonly	dated	 to	 the	 first	Atomic	bomb	 in	1945,	 itself	a	result	of	the	Manhattan	Project’s	hypertrophic	research	practices,	what	is	now	sometimes	called	‘the	anthropocene’	provides	a	good	example	of	the	university	 turning	 upon	 the	 shame	 of	 its	 own	 history.	 	 (4)	 The	 turn	 to	 affect.	Though	canonized	in	anthologies	such	as	The	Affective	Turn:	Theorizing	the	Social	(2007)	 and	The	Affect	Theory	Reader	 (2010),	 affect	 remains	 a	 difficult	 term	 to	delineate,	 sometimes	associated	with	 the	materialism	of	modern	brain	 science,	and	 sometimes	 with	 the	 reputed	 demise	 of	 poststructuralism.6	Affect	 is	 often	distinguished	 from	 emotion,7	and	 in	 the	 most	 general	 terms	 used	 to	 signal	investments	 in	 pre-linguistic	 embodiment,	 generative	 intensity	 and	 the	inassimilable	 relations	 of	 becoming	 (see	 for	 example,	 Patricia	 Clough,	 Brian	Massumi,	and,	always	standing	in	the	background,	the	work	of	Gilles	Deleuze).	8	In	the	most	optimistic	readings,	affect	offers	us	a	radical	contrast	to	theories	of	emotion	 that	 conservatively	 bind	 us	 to	 an	 already	 coded	world	 of	 objects.	 For	Silvan	Tompkins,	the	mid	20th	century	psychologist	whose	work,	 introduced	by	Adam	Frank	and	Eve	Kosofsky	Sedgwick,	has	proven	so	 influential	 in	 this	 field,	shame/humiliation	 takes	 its	 place	 as	 one	 of	 nine	 basic	 affects.9	Importantly,																																																									6	Patricia	 Ticineto	 Clough	 and	 Jean	 Halley	 (Eds.),	 The	 Affective	 Turn:	 Theorizing	 the	 Social.	Durham	 and	 London,	 Duke	 University	 Press:	 2007;	 Melissa	 Gregg	 and	 Gregory	 J.	 Seigworth	(Eds.),	The	Affect	Theory	Reader.		Durham	and	London,	Duke	University	Press:	2010.	7	Jonathan	Flatley,	 for	 example,	writes	 that	whereas	 ‘emotion	 suggests	 something	 that	happens	inside	 and	 tends	 toward	 outward	 expression,	 affect	 indicates	 something	 relational	 and	transformative.’	 See	 Jonathan	 Flatley,	 Affective	 Mapping:	 Melancholia	 and	 the	 Politics	 of	
Modernism.	(Harvard	University	Press,	2008):	12.	Sara	Ahmed,	however,	has	argued	convincingly	against	positing	a	clean	distinction	between	emotion	and	affect,	not	 least	because	 the	 ‘contrast	between	 a	 mobile	 impersonal	 affect	 and	 a	 contained	 personal	 emotion	 suggests	 that	 the	affect/emotion	distinction	can	operate	as	a	gendered	distinction.’	See	Sara	Ahmed,	The	Cultural	
Politics	of	Emotion	(2nd	edition).	(Edinburgh	University	Press,	2014):	207.		8 	Patricia	 Ticineto	 Clough,	 Autoaffection:	 Unconscious	 Thought	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 Technology.	(Minneapolis,	Minnesota	Press:	2000);	Massumi,	Op.	cit.	9	Eve	Kosofsky	Sedgwick	and	Adam	Frank	(Eds.),	Shame	and	Its	Sisters:	A	Silvan	Tomkins	Reader.	(Durham	and	London,	Duke	University	Press:	1995).	
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within	 this	 psycho-biological	 paradigm	 shame	 is	 not	 determined	 by	 particular	scenes:	 although	 a	 certain	 scene	 might	 be	 ‘culturally	 scripted’	 to	 direct	 and	contain	our	shame	–	a	child	being	beaten	by	an	adult,	say	–	we	cannot	say	of	 it	that	is	it	necessarily	shameful.10	This	is	because	the	intensity	of	an	affect	remains	independent	 of	 (autonomous	 from)	 the	object	 it	 attaches	 to.11		As	we	 shall	 see	throughout	 this	 volume,	 shame	 has	 most	 often	 come	 to	 occupy	 the	 space	between	 affect	 and	 discourse:	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 pointing	 towards	 the	 auto-affective	capacities	of	embodiment,	and	on	the	other	to	the	reflexive	component	of	being	ashamed	(the	shame	of	shame,	or	shame’s	impropriety),	which	involves	the	suspicion	that	we	are	feeling	someone	else’s	shame,	or,	indeed,	that	our	felt	shame	 disregards,	 affectively	 short-circuits,	 the	 attempt	 to	 understand	 its	historical	conditions.		If	 academic	 writing	 in	 the	 Humanities	 and	 Social	 Sciences	 has	conventionally	 been	 granted	 a	 critical	 function,	 and	more	 lately	 a	melancholic	cast	of	mind	(consider	the	influence	of	Judith	Butler’s	work),	then	perhaps,	with	the	fourfold	tendency	towards	shame	just	outlined,	it	has	become,	at	last,	a	truly	confessional	 mode.	 Certainly	 we	 can	 say	 of	 recent	 works	 (especially	 by	 those	working	 within	 anti-colonial	 and	 queer	 paradigms)	 that	 there	 is	 an	 increased	recognition	of	 the	embodied	relations	that	stand	at	 the	heart	of	our	knowledge	economies	 –	 with	 consequences	 for	 our	 understanding	 of	 academic	 writing	conventions.	Whether	 it	 is	 Jacques	Derrida	 standing	wet	 and	 naked	 before	 his	cat,	 Elspeth	Probyn	 receiving	 an	 email	 from	an	 angry,	 humiliated	 colleague,	 or	Sedgwick	facing	the	empty	space	where	the	Twin	Towers	once	stood,	the	shame	idiom	 has	 come	 to	 involve	 the	 interpenetration	 of	 personal	 anecdote	 with	theory.12	Dodie	Bellamy,	(whose	life	writing	is	discussed	further	by	Kaye	Mitchell	in	 this	 volume),	 writes	 of	 how	 oppressive	 she	 finds	 the	 impersonality	 of																																																									10	Ahmed	 offers	 a	 necessary	 reminder	 vis	 a	 vis	 Tomkins:	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 say	 that	 cultural	scripts	 channel	 our	 biological	 affects	 in	 certain	 directions,	 we	 must	 also	 admit	 that	 cultural	scripts	–	 the	script	of	 the	stranger,	 say	–	generate	 affects,	 including	shame,	by	creating	general	receptacles	for	affect	using	historically	particular	images:	is	the	black	face	more	strange	than	the	white	face;	and	is	 it	 therefore	more	 ‘natural’	 that	I	attach	the	affect	of	 fear	there?	 ‘Sticky’	 is	 the	term	 Ahmed	 uses	 to	 designate	 the	 emotional	 and	 affective	 dimensions	 which	 underlie	 all	research.	We	are	attached	to	our	knowledge	in	various	complicated	and	complicit	ways.	11	Massumi,	Op.	cit.:	35.	12	Jacques	 Derrida,	 The	 Animal	 That	 Therefore	 I	 Am.	 Translated	 by	 David	 Wills.	 (New	 York:	Fordham	 University	 Press,	 2009);	 Elspeth	 Probyn,	 Blush:	 Faces	 of	 Shame	 (Minneapolis:	Minnesota	 University	 Press,	 2005);	 Eve	 Kosofky	 Sedgwick,	Touching,	 Feeling:	Affect,	 Pedagogy,	
Performativity	(Durham	&	London,	Duke	University	Press:	2003).		
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academic	 essays:	 ‘how	 exciting	 –	 and	 important	 –	 [it	 is]	 to	 undermine	 the	patriarchal	hegemony	that	created	the	MLA	Style	Sheet’.	Or,	as	she	puts	it	more	succinctly	 a	page	 later:	 ‘what	 the	 fuck	 I	wanted	 to	do	was	 to	 shit	 on	 academic	pretension.’13		Inevitably,	such	confessions	are	as	narcissistic	as	they	are	honest:	as	 invested	 in	 the	 affective	 capacities	 of	 being	 an	 embodied	 self	 as	 in	 the	admission	of	particular	historical	 transgressions.	 In	 this	context,	 the	noticeable	move	away	 from	the	 term	guilt	 towards	shame	 in	university	writing	(a	 longer-term	 trend	 discussed	 further	 below)	 stands	 alongside	 the	 ubiquity	 of	 J.M.	Coetzee’s	 	 Disgrace	 (1999),	 a	 novel	 whose	 protagonist	 David	 Lurie	 is	 a	Communications	 Professor	 (erstwhile	 Comparative	 Literature	 Professor)	transgressing	 the	 terms	 of	 his	 office	 by	 sexually	 accosting	 a	 student.14	Lurie’s	adamant	 refusal	 to	display	his	 shame	 in	 the	University’s	Committee	of	 Inquiry,	which	 he	 deems	 an	 improper	 and	 performative	 extrapolation	 from	 the	rationalization	of	his	admitted	guilt,	haunts	the	rest	of	the	novel.	Having	initially	dismissed	as	unnecessary	 his	personal	humiliation	before	others,	 by	 the	end	of	the	book,	once	associated	to	a	series	of	violent	humiliations	in	the	South	African	countryside,	 including	 the	 rape	of	his	daughter	by	 local	men	 (or	boys)	and	 the	hopeless	 labour	of	euthanizing	unwanted	dogs,	Lurie	come	to	embody	the	very	
necessity	of	shame.	Disgrace	 is	a	novel	 in	which	the	university	discourse	can	be	no	 more	 separated	 from	 the	 decolonizing	 politics	 of	 South	 Africa	 than	 the	exchangeable	 abstractions	 of	 the	 law	 can	 be	 separated	 from	 the	 shameful	entanglements	of	non-exchangeable	bodies	contesting	space.		With	this	chastening	coordinate	in	mind,	we	introduce	the	essays	in	this	volume	–	all	originated	from	the	American	and	European	university	systems	–	as	fundamentally	 shameful.	 However,	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 they	 are	 offered	complacently.	While	it	is	clear	that	this	work,	like	any	other	can	be	read	for	what	it	omits,	we	aim	to	draw	together	 two	 facets	of	 shame	 through	 the	question	of	literary	and	academic	writing.	First,	the	general	shame	produced	by	all	writing:	that	of	being	superfluous,	of	making	the	proper	improper,	of	exposing	more	than	it	is	necessary	to	expose.	And	second,	the	historical	situations	which	force	us	to	read	shame’s	general	auto-affective	character	in	more	specifically	political	ways.																																																									13	Dodie	Bellamy,	When	the	Sick	Rule	the	World.	(South	Pasadena	Semiotext(e):	2015):	53;	55.	14	J.M.	Coetzee,	Disgrace	(London,	Secker	&	Warburg:	1999).	
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After	 giving	 further	 thought	 to	 the	 general	 dynamics	 of	 shame	–	 its	 pathology,	tense,	 and	 questionable,	 though	 mythopoeic,	 universality	 –	 we	 shall	 consider	three	 particularizing	 histories	 which	 underlie,	 we	 suggest,	 the	 constituency	 of	modern	writing:	 the	 shame	 of	 the	 anthropological	 gaze;	 the	 shame	 of	 bearing	witness	 to	 historical	 catastrophes	 such	 as	 the	 Holocaust;	 and	 the	 shame	 of	acknowledging	the	structural	violence	of	colonization.		
	
	
Shame,	writing,	action	We	can	begin,	 then,	 by	 considering	 the	 grammar	of	 shame.	The	 first	 and	quite	obvious	observation	 to	note	 is	 that	 shame	can	be	deployed	as	a	noun	and	as	a	verb.15	And	yet	it	is	rare	that	we	encounter	the	abstract	noun	‘shame’	without	at	least	 the	 implication	of	 action,	 and	of	movement.	 	 If	 I	 am	paralyzed	by	 shame,	trapped	within	 the	 confines	of	my	own	self,	 it	 is	probably	because	 I	have	been	caught	 out.	 While	 it	 is	 me	 who	 feels	 exposed,	 trapped	 in	 my	 body,	 it	 is	 also	always	my	body	entered	into	a	relation	with	other	bodies	–	I	am	ashamed	when	I	find	myself	delineated	or	differentiated	by	being	out	of	place.	As	Liz	Constable	reminds	 us,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 shame	 cannot	 be	 said	 to	 “belong”	 to	anybody,	 despite	 being	 very	 much	 about	 the	 problem	 of	 belonging.16	Another	way	of	putting	this,	in	keeping	with	most	famous	depiction	of	shame	in	the	canon	of	European	art,	Masaccio’s	The	Expulsion	from	the	Garden	of	Eden	 (1425),	 is	 to	say	that	shame	is	scenographic	rather	than,	strictly	speaking,	psychological:	it	is	a	felt	condition	which	also	has	to	be	seen	to	be	felt,	and	which	therefore	always	elucidates	 something	 of	 the	 space	 in	 which	 it	 occurs.	 It	 is	 an	 internal	 feeling	which	 actively	 founds	 the	 external	 background	 against	 which	 it	 can	 be																																																									15	Ranjana	 Khanna	 has	 spelt	 out	 some	 of	 the	 intricacies	 of	 shame’s	 grammar	 in	 the	 following	passage:	‘Is	it	always	in	response	to	a	regulative	ideal?	Is	it	constituted	through	that	regulation?	Or	is	it	organic?	Is	it	a	state	in	itself,	or	is	it	a	dynamic	entity	even	if	not	always	public	in	the	most	literal	sense?	Whether	verb	(to	shame)	or	noun	(shame)	one	has	to	consider	whether	some	kind	of	action	is	involved	in	both.		Is	it	transitive	or	intransitive?	Reflexive	or	not?	Does	its	action	pass	over	 to	 an	 object	 or	 not?	 Is	 it	 a	 response	 to	 an	 object,	 or	 a	 function	 of	 being-in-the-world?’	Ranjana	 Khanna,	 ‘Fabric,	 skin,	 honte-ologie’	 in	 Shame	 and	 Sexuality:	 Psychoanalysis	 and	 Visual	
Culture.	Edited	by	Claire	Pajaczkowska	and	Ivan	Ward.	(Hove:	Routledge,	2008):	159-179.			16	Constable	argues	that	the	experience	of	shame	‘needs	to	be	understood	as	both	an	intrapsychic	and	 intersubjective	 lens	 through	which	a	sense	of	belonging	 is	magnified	or	shattered,	an	affect	intensely	 linked	to	what	 it	means	to	belong,	 to	the	processes	of	 fitting	 in,	as	well	as	to	those	of	becoming	 a	 misfit.’	 E.	 L.	 Constable,	 ‘Introduction:	 States	 of	 Shame’	 in	 L’Esprit	 Créateur	 (39.4.	1999:	3-12):	6.		
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witnessed.	 Related	 to	 this	 scenic	 visualization	 of	 my	 own	 shame,	 is	 the	phenomenology	of	vicarious	shame,	a	common	and	yet	somehow	extraordinary	experience	of	shame’s	mobility,	in	which	the	witness,	ostensibly	standing	outside	the	 scene,	 suddenly	 becomes	 the	 object	 within.	 More	 spectacular	 than	 a	voluntary	 identification	 with	 others,	 understood	 as	 sympathy	 or	 compassion,	say,	 vicarious	 shame	 potentially	 rips	 through	 the	 contours	 of	 the	 subject,	throwing	 into	 disarray	 the	 formal	 distinctions	 between	 inside	 and	 outside,	background	and	foreground.		The	 best	 known	 of	 several	 attempts	 in	 mid-twentieth-century	 French	philosophy	 to	 capture	 the	 inter-scopic	 and	 vicarious	 predicament	 of	 shame	 is	Jean	Paul	Sartre’s	discussion	of	 the	 look	 [le	 regard],	 specifically	 the	 interaction	between	the	transcendent	subject	perceiving	others	[les	autres[	in	the	world	and	the	 same	 subject	 finding	 himself	 being	 looked	 at	 by	 the	 Other	 [l’Autrui].	 For	Sartre	 it	 is	 the	 enigma	 of	 the	 Other’s	 unperceivable	 eyes,	 (those	 which	 are	looking	at	me!),	which	allows	me	to	apprehend	my	own	vulnerability:	‘that	I	have	a	body	which	 can	be	hurt,	 that	 I	 occupy	a	place	 and	 that	 I	 can	not	 in	 any	 case	escape	 from	 the	 space	 in	 which	 I	 am	 without	 defense’.17		 The	 snooping	 man	outside	the	door,	leaning	over	the	keyhole,	feels	footsteps	behind	him:	he	is	seen	looking,	 and	 thereby	 given	 a	 situation,	 revealed	 to	 himself	 as	 fallen	 into	 the	world.	 ‘It	 is	shame	or	pride	which	reveals	 to	me	the	Other’s	 look	and	myself	at	the	end	of	that	look.	It	is	the	shame	or	pride	which	makes	me	live,	not	know	the	situation	of	being	looked	at,’	writes	Sartre;	and	later,	that	pride	or	shame	is	‘the	feeling	of	being	finally	what	 I	am	but	elsewhere,	over	there	 for	the	Other’.18		 In	Sartre’s	 account,	 there	 is	 something	 inherently	 shameful	 about	 ego	 formation,	about	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘I	have	my	 foundation	outside	myself’.19	It	 is	 the	Other	who	confers	 upon	 me	 a	 boundary,	 and	 who	 spatialises	 and	 temporalizes	 my	 self	beyond	 (in	 excess	of)	 the	 terms	of	 a	 transcendent	 subjective	 consciousness.	 In	
																																																								17	Jean-Paul	Sartre,	Being	and	Nothingness:	An	Essay	on	Phenomenological	Ontology.	Translated	by	Hazel	E.	Barnes.	(Oxon,	Routledge	Classics:	2003	[1943]):	282.		18	Ibid.:	 284-5;	 291.	We	 can	 note	 that	 Sartre	 seems	 to	 share	 with	 the	 poet	William	 Blake	 the	intuition	 that	 ‘Shame	 is	 Prides	 cloke’.	 	 William	 Blake,	 ‘The	 Proverbs	 of	 Hell’	 in	 The	 Complete	
Poetry	and	Prose	of	William	Blake.	Edited	by	David	V.	Erdman	(Berkley,	University	of	California	Press:	2008):	36.	19	Sartre,	Op.	cit.:	284.	
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the	grand	tradition	of	Hegelian	phenomenology	what	 is	most	shameful	 is	 that	 I	depend	upon	the	freedom	of	the	Other’s	look	in	order	to	recognize	myself.		Emmanuel	Levinas,	writing	before	Sartre	in	1935	on	the	theme	of	escape,	and	 more	 precisely	 on	 the	 inescapably	 of	 being	 oneself,	 recalls	 us	 to	 a	 very	ordinary	 instance	of	 the	 self’s	 spilling	 over	 itself:	 ‘The	 sick	person	 in	 isolation,	who	 ‘was	 taken	 ill’	 and	who	has	no	 choice	but	 to	 vomit,	 is	 still	 scandalized	by	himself.’20	Here	 shame	 arises	 with	 the	 confusion	 between	 bodily	 isolation	 and	exposure	before	the	Other,	and	is	manifest	through	an	act	of	physical	expulsion	which	is	at	once	an	illness	and	a	catharsis,	a	depletion	and	a	surplus	of	being.	The	scene	 poses	 a	 question,	 not	 unrelated	 to	 the	 question	 posed	 by	 the	 scene	 of	writing:	is	this	vomit	me?		If	 shame	 threatens	 to	 disrupt	 our	 boundaries	 in	 this	 way,	 leaving	 us	stripped	of	the	confidence	to	be	proprietorial	(am	I	merely	an	object	in	someone	
else’s	world?),	we	might	also	expect	it	to	disturb	our	language.	Indeed,	the	prefix	‘dis’,	suggesting	division	or	dual	motion	(a	two-way-ness),	gives	us	a	ready	clue	to	 the	 work	 that	 shame	 does:	 in	 the	 work	 of	 dislocation,	 displacement	 and	dispossession,	shame	enacts	an	undoing	or	a	becoming	undone	–	I	am	shattered,	
and	out-of-place.	 And	 yet,	 equally,	 in	 its	 proximity	 to	 disgust,	 and	what	 Silvan	Tomkins	has	called	‘dissmell’,	shame	enacts	a	recall	to	the	finitude	of	the	body	–	I	
am	 sequestered	 here,	 smelling	 my	 own	 death.	 	 This	 duality,	 of	 being	 at	 once	displaced	 and	 inescapably	 oneself,	 is	 the	 ontological	 enactment	 of	 shame	 as	 a	private	 feeling	which	 always	 elaborates	 a	public	world.	 	 The	 subject	who	 feels	ashamed	 is	 never	 quite	 alone;	 and	 contrariwise,	 the	 subject	 who	 calls	 down	shame	 upon	 another,	 availing	 of	 the	 dis	 of	 disgust	 or	 disrespect,	 never	 quite	belongs	 to	 the	 public	world	 in	 the	way	 he	 imagines.	 If	 I	 have	 put	 you	 in	 your	place	in	the	name	of	some	public	law	or	morality,	then	the	chances	are	that	in	the	process	 I	have	displaced	myself.	This	 is	what	 the	sick	man	 in	 isolation	and	 the	offended	man	in	the	street	demonstrate,	together:	that	shame	is	a	relational	and	double-dealing	sentiment,	and	that	the	shame	of	shame	invariably	rebounds.	
																																																								20	Emmanuel	Levinas	writes	of	‘the	shame	of	being	there’,	the	scandal	of	having	a	body	and	being,	inescapably,	oneself:	‘The	sick	person	in	isolation,	who	‘was	taken	ill’	and	who	has	no	choice	but	to	 vomit,	 is	 still	 scandalized	by	himself.’	On	Escape	 [De	 l’évasion].	 Translated	by	Bettina	Bergo.	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2003	[1935]):	67.	
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Tomkins’	 work	 is	 especially	 rich	 when	 describing	 the	 rebounding	dynamism	 of	 the	 shame	 affect.	 His	 most	 pithy	 definition	 of	 shame	 as	 ‘the	incomplete	 reduction	 of	 interest	 or	 joy’	 draws	 our	 attention	 to	 those	 social	attachments	 that	obdurately	remain	after	 the	self-protective	work	of	 inhibition	or	closure	has	taken	place.	21		Here,	the	scene	underlying	all	such	attachments	is	psychoanalytic	 in	 character,	 performing	 the	 disruption	 of	 the	 infant-mother	gestalt:	the	infant’s	turning	away,	determinative	of	the	ego,	remains	nonetheless	dependent	 upon	 the	 nourishments	 of	 the	maternal	 world.	 This	 withdrawal	 or	contraction	of	self,	combined	with	persistent	interest	in	the	Other,	sets	the	terms	for	all	subsequent	scenes	of	social	shame.	Such	scenes	are	empirically	diverse	of	course,	 as	 well	 as	 being	 paradoxical,	 and	 they	 place	 a	 writerly	 demand	 upon	those	who	would	seek	to	describe	them.	Indeed,	Tomkins’	writing	on	this	topic	is	‘astonishingly	 heterogeneous’	 according	 to	 Sedgwick	 and	 Frank;	 it	 ‘nurtures,	pacifies,	replenishes,	then	sets	the	idea	in	motion	again’.22	Certainly	it	delights	in	qualifications	 and	 indeterminate	 catalogues,	 to	 an	 extent	 that	 Sedgwick	 and	Frank	 deem	 almost	 Proustian,	 and	 its	 speculative	 accounts	 of	 subjective	experience	bring	the	scientific	ambition	of	his	project	(to	map	the	basic	affects)	and	 the	 idiosyncratic	 nature	 of	 his	 expression	 into	perilously	 close	 agreement.	Here	 is	an	example	we	have	picked	out	 in	which	 it	 is	 clear	 that	Tomkins	has	a	writing	style:		 Let	us	consider	next	the	varieties	of	sources	of	shame	which	arise	from	love,	friendship,	and	close	interpersonal	relationships.	If	I	wish	to	touch	you	but	do	not	wish	to	be	touched,	I	may	feel	ashamed.	If	I	wish	to	look	at	you	but	you	do	not	wish	me	to,	I	may	feel	ashamed.		If	I	wish	you	to	look	at	me	but	you	do	not,	I	may	feel	ashamed.		If	I	wish	to	look	at	you	and	at	 the	 same	 time	wish	 that	 you	 look	at	me,	 I	 can	be	 shamed.	 	 If	 I	wish	to	be	close	to	you	but	you	move	away,	I	am	ashamed.		If	I	wish	to	suck	or	bite	your	body	and	you	are	reluctant,	I	can	become	ashamed.	If	I	
																																																								21	Silvan	 Tomkins	 in	 Eve	 Kosofsky	 Sedgwick	 and	 Adam	 Frank	 (Eds.),	 Shame	 and	 Its	 Sisters:	 A	
Silvan	Tomkins	Reader.	(Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	1995):	134.	22	Eve	 Kosofsky	 Sedgwick	 and	 Adam	 Frank,	 ‘Shame	 in	 the	 Cybernetic	 Fold’	 in	 Shame	 and	 Its	
Sisters:	A	Silvan	Tomkins	Reader.	Edited	by	Sedgwick,	Adam	Frank.	(Durham,	NC,	Duke	University	Press,	1995:1-28):	3.	
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wish	 to	hug	you	or	you	hug	me	or	we	hug	each	other	and	you	do	not	reciprocate	 my	 wishes,	 I	 feel	 ashamed.	 If	 I	 wish	 to	 have	 sexual	intercourse	with	you	but	you	do	not,	I	am	ashamed.23				With	all	these	‘ifs’	we	are	assured	that	these	are	imaginative,	rather	than	strictly	clinical,	vignettes,	pointing	out	shame’s	mimetic	character,	and	relating	it	to	the	reflexivity	 of	 the	 look	 –	 the	 looking	 and	 being	 looked	 at	 of	 Sartre’s	 regard.	However,	the	phenomenology	of	the	look	is	not	the	whole	point	in	Tomkins’	text;	the	point	is	also	the	too-muchness	of	the	writing.	Tomkins	sets	out	to	catalogue	examples	of	shame,	but	since	there	is	no	totality	of	circumstances	which	would	make	 this	 open-ended	 list	 scientifically	 comprehensive,	 we	 are	 drawn	 to	 its	rhetorical	 wantonness	 (‘If	 I	 wish	 to	 suck	 or	 bite	 your	 body	 and	 you	 are	reluctant…’).	Sedgwick	and	Frank’s	fascination	with	this	style	can	be	restated	as	the	realization	that	shame	is	not	simply	what	Tomkins	writes	about;	 it	 is	 in	his	writing.	 The	 pleasures	 of	 reading	 and	 writing	 shame	 –	 pleasures	 forever	adjoined	 to	 reluctance,	 repetition,	 frustration	 and	 block	 –	 are	 not	 merely	incidental	to	the	theme.		We	may	elucidate	this	point	by	considering	a	literary	example	from	George	Eliot’s	1876	novel	Daniel	Deronda	 in	which	the	phenomenology	of	a	blush	(that	attributed	 to	 Gwendolen	 Harlath,	 one	 of	 the	 novel’s	 two	 major	 characters)	collides	with	the	demands	of	narrative	sense.24	Gwendolen	is	vexed	to	have	been	seen	blushing,	and	so	performs	 the	self-protective	gymnastic	of	wheeling	away	from	company:		If	 any	 had	noticed	 her	 blush	 as	 significant,	 they	 had	 certainly	 not	interpreted	it	by	the	secret	windings	and	recesses	of	her	feelings.	A	blush	 is	 no	 language:	 only	 a	 dubious	 flag-signal	which	may	mean	either	 of	 two	 contradictories.	 Deronda	 alone	 had	 a	 faint	 guess	 at	
																																																								23	Silvan	Tomkins,	‘Shame-Humiliation	and	Contempt-Disgust’	in	Shame	and	Its	Sisters,	(Ibid.	133-178):	152.	24	See	also	W.	Ray	Crozier’s	‘The	blush:	literary	and	psychological	perspectives’	in	The	Theory	of	
Social	Behaviour.	Vol,	46.	No.	4	(2016:	502-516):	503.	
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some	 part	 of	 her	 feeling;	 but	while	 he	was	 observing	 her	 he	was	himself	under	observation.25		Gwendolen	 laments	 the	 fact	 that	 the	blush	has	entered	her	 into	an	 inter-scopic	social	 relation	 before,	 or	 outside	 of,	 linguistic	 representation.	 This	 is	 a	 lament	which	poses	a	formative	question	to	the	narrative	order,	the	blush	being	at	once	pre-linguistic	(‘no	language’)	and	productive	of	excessive	linguistic	signification	(‘If	any	had	noticed	her	blush	as	significant,	they	had	certainly	not	interpreted	it	by	 the	 secret	 […]	 of	 her	 feelings’).	 In	 one	 view	 we	 can	 conclude,	 in	 Brian	Massumi’s	 phrase,	 that	 	 ‘skin	 is	 faster	 than	 the	 word’,	 which	 is	 to	 say	 that	 it	registers	 an	 order	 of	 temporality	 capable	 of	 interrupting	 narrated	 time:	Gwendolen’s	 blush	 provides	 a	 trace	 of	 affective	 intensity	 which	 reveals	 the	narrative	 order	 of	 the	 novel	 to	 be	 a	 form	 of	 cover-up,	 sense	 disguising	nonsense.26	And	 yet,	 the	 very	 same	 blush	 is	 also	 readable	 as	 the	 iteration	 of	narrative	 convention,	 specifically	 within	 the	 romantic-political	 arena	 of	 the	Victorian	novel,	the	conventional	prolepsis	of	a	character’s	red	face	anticipating	an	idealised	sexual	and	social	union:	that	Gwendolen	blushes	and	Deronda	sees	her	 blush	 establishes	 the	 decorous	 terms	 of	 erotic	 estrangement	 which	 we	expect	to	be	overcome	over	the	course	of	the	narrative.	Ultimately,	however,	the	narrator’s	 reflections	 on	 the	 contradictoriness	 of	 any	 blush	 gesture	 beyond	Gwendolen’s	specifically	psychological	reasons	 for	wanting	to	deny	her	blush	a	meaning,	 and	move	us	 to	 the	novel’s	 striking	 failure	 to	 fulfill	 a	 romantic	union	between	Gwendolen	and	Deronda:	the	narrative	expectations	established	by	the	conventions	of	reading	skin	are	disappointed.	Accordingly,	the	meaninglessness	of	the	blush,	its	apparent	absurdity,	points	us	beyond	character	to	plot;	and	then,	through	 the	 false	 expectation	 of	 plot,	 to	 the	 act	 of	 writing	 itself	 (before	 any	narrative	 order	 has	 been	 imposed)	 to	 the	 biographical	 figure	 George	 Eliot,	 or	Mary	Anne	Evans,	sitting	at	her	desk,	negotiating	between	the	impulse	to	write	and	the	cover-up	of	having	written.		 Most	mythic	accounts	of	shame	recount	this	cover-up	in	the	past-historic	tense,	 thus	performing	 the	 fall	 from	Paradise	 into	 language	which	 is	 also	 their																																																									25	George	Eliot,	Daniel	Deronda	(Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press:	2014):	354.		26	Massumi,	Op.	cit.,	25.	
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explicit	 theme.	 	 Sigmund	 Freud,	 for	 example,	 in	Civilization	and	 Its	Discontents	invites	 us	 to	 consider	 how	 shame	 is	 intimately	 associated	 with	 the	anthropomorphic	act	of	genital	exposure	that	occurred	when	mankind	assumed	an	‘upright	gait’.	Shame	was	first	provoked	in	man	when,	moving	from	four	legs	to	 two,	 his	 genitals	 became	 ‘visible	 and	 in	 need	 of	 protection’	 (Scham	 in	 the	German,	 also	 connoting	 the	male	 genitals).27	To	 say	 that	 there	must	have	been	such	 an	 exposure	 covered-over	 in	 the	 past,	 at	 least	 in	 an	 imagined	 past,	 is	 to	suggest	that	the	feeling	of	shame	is	temporally	as	well	as	spatially	arranged.	This	accords	 with	 Giorgio	 Agamben’s	 treatment	 of	 the	 biblical	 Fall	 in	 his	 essay	‘Nudity’.28	Agamben	 stresses	 that	 the	 mythic	 fall	 into	 Original	 Sin	 marks	 the	passage	from	nakedness	to	nudity,	where	the	former	was	a	mythic	state	without	shame	and	 the	 latter	an	event	 in	time:	Adam	and	Eve	suffer	not	because	of	 the	present	 fact	 of	 their	 bodily	 nakedness	 before	 God,	 but	 rather	 through	 God’s	inference	of	their	nudity	beneath	the	fig	leaf.29	Nudity	happens;	it	is	something	to	be	activated:	we	can	at	any	moment	be	denuded	of	our	clothes,	conventions,	the	labours	of	our	civilization	–	including	of	language.	Which	is	to	say,	like	Adam	and	Eve,	we	 exist	 in	 anticipation	of	 a	 return	 to	 our	 original	 disgrace	 (our	denuded	bodies	 which	 can	 never	 be	 naked	 again).	 Sharing	 affinities	 with	 the	 critical	questioning	of	 the	philosopher	and	 the	obscene	demand	of	 the	 sadist	 to	 ‘make	flesh	 appear’,	 the	 shameful	 consciousness	 operates	 through	 narrative	 as	 the	possibility	of	its	unraveling.	It	is	when	we	know	that	language	covers	us	that	we	feel	historically	vulnerable	to	being	exposed.30		 What	 is	 most	 remarkable	 about	 the	 previously	 quoted	 passage	 from	
Daniel	 Deronda,	 then,	 is	 that	 its	 discursive	 intervention	 comes	 so	 close	 to	denuding	 its	 own	 narrative	 elaboration	 (‘no	 language’),	 thereby	 exposing	 the	scandal	 of	 writing	 itself.	 It	 comes	 close	 to	 confessing,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	contingent	(not	already	meaningfully	coded)	interaction	between	a	body	and	the	text.		Whilst	in	anthropological	or	psycho-biological	terms	the	blush	is	taken	for	a																																																									27	Sigmund	 Freud,	 Civilization	 and	 Its	 Discontents	 in	 The	 Standard	 Edition	 of	 the	 Complete	Psychological	 Works	 of	 Sigmund	 Freud,	 Volume	 XXI	 (London:	 The	 Hogarth	 Press	 and	 the	Institute	of	Psycho-analysis.,	1961	[1930]):	99.	28	Giorgio	 Agamben,	 ‘Nudity’	 in	 Nudities.	 Translated	 by	 David	 Kishik	 and	 Stefan	 Pedatella.	(Stanford,	Stanford	University	Press,	2010:	55-90).	29	Ibid.:	68.	30	Ibid.:	74.	
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conventional	manifestation	of	shame,	once	figured	in	literature	it	also	potentially	reflects	a	doubleness	inherent	to	the	narrative	act:	writing	as	sublimation	up	and	away	 from	 the	 body	 into	 measured	 linguistic	 exchange;	 and	 writing	 as	 de-sublimation,	 a	 writing	 against,	 which	 returns	 always	 to	 an	 un-exchangeable	body’s	 relation	 to	 itself.	 Helen	 Merell	 Lynd	 has	 written	 suggestively	 of	 how	certain	 modern-period	 texts	 give	 exceptional	 focus	 to	 specific	 body	 parts	 –	Dimitri	 Karamazov’s	 hideous	 big	 toes,	 for	 example,	 or	 Phillip’s	 clubfoot	 in	W.	Somerset	Maugham’s	Of	Human	Bondage.31	In	such	cases,	acknowledged	shame	is	 indexed	 to	 a	 single	 body’s	 relation	 to	 itself;	 the	 characters	 in	 these	 novels	suffer	 not	 primarily	 because	 of	 exposure	 before	 others,	 but	 rather	 due	 to	 the	necessity	of	bearing	unrelenting	witness	to	themselves.	Shame,	offers	Jacqueline	Rose,	is	‘the	only	affect	which	works	internally,	passing	from	one	to	another	part	of	 the	 self.’32	The	 blush	 illustrates	 such	 an	 understanding:	 transferential	 in	nature,	it	also	presents	a	kind	of	proof	of	the	shameful	body	as	auto-poetic;	it	is	the	beacon	for	a	subjectivity	generating	its	own	content	in	significant	separation	from	a	larger,	more	objective	history.33	Such	dissociation	of	character	from	plot	is	a	familiar	modernist	trope,	of	course,	as	is	the	sense	of	affective	disproportion	which	 accompanies	 it.	 Lynd	 establishes	 this	 out-of-jointness	 through	 the	character	 of	 Joseph	 K.	 in	 Kafka’s	 The	 Trial	 who	 translates	 the	 impersonal	circumstances	of	his	abduction	by	 the	Law	into	 the	pain	of	personal	 failure:	he	felt	 ‘the	shame	of	being	delivered	 into	the	hands	of	 these	people	by	his	 sudden																																																									31	Helen	 Merell	 Lynd,	 ‘The	 Nature	 of	 Shame’	 in	 Guilt	 and	 Shame.	 Edited	 by	 Herbert	 Morris	(California,	Wadsworth	Publishing	Company,	1971:159-202):	160.	32	Jacqueline	Rose,	On	Not	Being	Able	to	Sleep:	Psychoanalysis	and	the	Modern	World.	(Chatto	and	Windus,	London:	2003):	4.	Another	way	of	 framing	 this	point	 is	 that	metonymy,	which	Roman	Jakobson	 famously	 considered	 the	 major	 device	 of	 realist	 fiction,	 nominating	 the	 synecdochic	details	used	by	Tolstoy	as	exemplary	(Anna	Karenina’s	handbag,	the	bare	shoulders	of	a	female	character	 in	War	and	Peace),	gets	 impossibly	stuck	as	 the	physical	part	begins	 to	confound	 the	organizing	 intelligence	 of	 the	 narrator	 who	 wanted	 to	 put	 everything	 into	 symbolic	 relation.	(Jakobson,	Fundamentals	of	Language	(2nd	Edition).		(Berlin/New	York,	Mouton	de	Gruyter:	2002	[1956]):	90-96.	33	Socially	 and	 narratively	 speaking	 (in	 terms	 of	 modest	 witness)	 the	 blush	 is	 both	 a	 defense	against,	 but	 also	 an	 oblique	 invitation	 to,	 the	 other’s	 desire.	 It	 is	 also	 synesthetic,	 where	synesthesia	originally,	in	physiological	discourse,	referred	to	a	stimulation	applied	to	one	part	of	the	body	 felt	 in	another.	The	blush	we	might	 say	 is	 exemplarily	 synesthetic	 since	 it	 registers	a	feeling	or	sensation	whose	cause	is	almost	never	treated	organically,	or	localized	etiologically	in	the	 face;	 rather	 it	 is	 overwhelmingly	 taken	 up	 and	 transferred	within	 a	 cultural	 and	 symbolic	network	of	interpretations	which	render	its	material	sensation	essentially	immaterial,	or	‘merely	psychological’,	and	carefully	translates	the	priapic	exhibitionism	of	a	red	face	into	the	socialized	and	 veiling	 terms:	 coy,	 shy,	modest,	 shrinking	 violet.	 The	 idealized	 ‘polite	 society’,	 a	 society	 of	sensible	 subjects	 –	which	 is	 to	 say,	 subjects	who	have	 acquired	 sensibility	 –	 depends	on	 some	degree	of	synesthetic	acumen	in	order	to	organize	the	appropriate	distance	between	bodies.	
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weakness’	 (emphasis	 ours).34	The	 loss	 of	 a	 comprehensible	 position	 within	 a	broad	 network	 of	 symbolic	 meanings	 at	 once	 reduces	 and	 intensifies	 K.’s	experience	of	selfhood:	the	ashamed	self	becomes	an	excessive	burden.		It	remains	unclear,	however,	whether	shame	is	the	cause	or	the	effect	of	such	 a	 characteristic	 falling	 short	 of	 a	 storyline,	 since	 the	 formal	 disconnect	produced	by	K.’s	removal	from	the	assurances	of	plot	(a	plot	in	which	we	might	eventually	 find	 out	who	has	 been	 spreading	 lies	 about	 Joseph	K.)	 also	 ensures	that	the	author-function	is	contaminated	by	the	affective	life	of	the	protagonist.	To	say,	for	instance,	that	K.	is	Kafkaesque,	though	stopping	just	short	of	saying	he	is	 indeed	 ‘Kafka’,	 nonetheless	 sustains	 the	 suspicion	 that	 through	 the	impersonality	 of	 the	 written	 form	 moves	 the	 personality	 of	 the	 artistic	 self.	Likewise,	 Henry	 James’s	 prefaces,	 or	 Virginia	 Woolf’s	 essays	 offer	 more	 than	secondary	explanations	to	those	works	they	are	often	seen	to	accompany;	rather	they	 supplement	 and	 inter-penetrate,	 even	 potentially	 undermine	 the	 formal	cohesion	 of	 the	 authors’	 named	 fictions.	 For	 Sedgwick,	 in	 her	 essay	 ‘Shame,	Theatricality,	 and	 Queer	 Performativity:	 Henry	 James’s	 The	 Art	 of	 the	 Novel’,	James’s	 prefaces	 are	 ‘a	 strategy	 for	 dramatizing	 and	 integrating	 shame,	 in	 the	sense	of	rendering	this	potentially	paralyzing	affect	narratively,	emotionally,	and	performatively	productive.’35		The	writer	emerges,	 shy	and	exhibitionist,	 as	 the	reader	of	his	own	work.		Of	 course	 this	 view	 goes	 against	 a	 certain	 orthodoxy	 concerning	modernism:	if	everybody	knows	that	Leopold	Bloom	in	his	spit	is	a	Joycean	artist	of	the	everyday,	it	still	seems	a	temerity	befitting	a	writer	like	Wyndham	Lewis	to	suggest	that	J.	Alfred	Prufrock	and	T.S.	Eliot	share	key	personality	traits.	And	yet	attempts	to	join	the	phenomenological	and	autobiographical	to	the	textual,	to	place	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 writer	 struggling	 with	 the	 demand	 to	 write	 within	 a	textual	 frame,	are	also,	 in	part,	 readings	against	 the	 institutionalization	of	high	literary	 accomplishment.	What	 is	 now	 commonly	 called	 life	writing,	 as	well	 as	blurring	 the	 line	 between	 fiction	 and	 autobiography,	 often	 returns	 us	 to	 the	figure	 of	 the	 writer:	 not	 the	 institutional	 author	 –	 the	 proper	 name	 who	 has																																																									34	Kafka	cited	in	H.M.	Lynd,	Op	cit.:	164.	35	Eve	 Kosofsky	 Sedgwick,	 ‘Shame,	 Theatricality,	 and	 Queer	 Performativity:	 Henry	 James’s	The	
Art	of	the	Novel’	 in	Touching	Feeling:	Affect,	Pedagogy,	Performativity	(London	&	Durham,	Duke	University	Press,	2003:	35-66):	44.	
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always	 already	 written,	 but	 the	 precarious	 bodily	 self	 actively	 entering	 into	contingent	 relations	 with	 itself	 and	 other	 selves.	 This	 kind	 of	 writing	 often	invokes	its	own	heritage,	including,	importantly,	classical	modes	of	plain	speech,	which	have	been	traced	genealogically	by	Foucault	as	the	tradition	of	Parrhesia.	Eschewing	the	techniques	of	rhetoric	and	persuasion,	and	drawing	attention	to	the	 vulnerability	 of	 the	 speaker,	 who	was	 often	 speaking	 against	 the	 received	opinions	 of	 those	 in	 power,	 Foucault	 tells	 us	 that	 classical	 plain	 speaking	 (or	risky	speech)	fulfilled	the	double	function	of	political	and	personal	critique:	from	the	Cynics	to	Socrates	‘there	[was]	a	relation	between	the	rational	discourse,	the	logos,	you	are	able	to	use,	and	the	way	that	you	live’.36		However,	Foucault	is	also	careful	to	distinguish	the	classical	act	of	speaking	plainly	through	the	wisdom	of	personal	 experience	 (ethos)	 from	 more	 modern,	 Christianized	 conceptions	 of	confession	where	the	emphasis	is	upon	a	sinful	and	sexualized	body.	The	Greek	Cynic	 Diogenes	 masturbating	 in	 public	 (a	 physical	 manifestation	 of	 his	 many	indecorous	 barbs	 at	 those	 in	 power),	 though	 situated	 at	 the	 very	 edge	 of	 the	‘parrhesiastic	 contract’,	was	 yet	 imbued	with	 the	 dignity	 of	 critique:	 his	was	 a	shameless	act	designed	to	call	out	social	contradictions	as	well	as	advertise	his	own	 ethos.	 	 In	 modern,	 specifically	 Christianized	 terms,	 however,	 any	 such	understanding	is	bound	to	be	further	overdetermined	according	to	a	reading	of	spiritual	 or	 psycho-pathological	 symptoms.37 	Similarly,	 though	 the	 essential	value	of	risky	speech	in	Ancient	Greece	was	that	of	speaking	truth	to	power,	the	
																																																								36	More	 fully,	Foucault	says:	 ‘Here,	giving	an	account	of	your	 life,	your	bios,	is	also	not	 to	give	a	narrative	 of	 the	 historical	 events	 that	 have	 taken	place	 in	 your	 life,	 but	 rather	 to	 demonstrate	whether	you	are	able	to	show	that	there	is	a	relation	between	the	rational	discourse,	the	 logos,	you	are	able	to	use	and	the	way	that	you	live.’	Michel	Foucault,	Fearless	Speech.	Edited	by	Joseph	Pearson	(Los	Angeles,	Semiotext(e):	2001):	97.		37	For	 example,	 the	 scandalous	 truth-telling	 of	 Diogenes	 the	 Cynic	 does	 not	 reverberate	 in	 the	following	contemporary	scene	of	public	display	offered	by	Sedgwick:			‘I	used	to	ask	listeners	to	join	in	a	thought	experiment,	visualizing	an	unwashed,	half-insane	man	who	would	wander	into	the	lecture	hall	mumbling	loudly,	his	speech	increasingly	accusatory	and	disjointed,	and	publically	urinate	in	the	front	of	the	room,	then	wander	out	again.		I	pictured	the	excruciation	of	everyone	else	 in	the	room:	each	looking	down,	wishing	to	be	anywhere	else	yet	conscious	of	 the	 inexorable	 fate	of	being	exactly	 there,	 inside	 the	 individual	skin	of	which	each	was	 burningly	 aware;	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 though,	 unable	 to	 stanch	 the	 hemorrhage	 of	 painful	identification	with	 the	misbehaving	man.	 That’s	 the	 double	movement	 shame	makes:	 towards	painful	 individuation,	 toward	 uncontrollable	 relationality.’	 Eve	 Kosofsky	 Sedgwick,	 ‘Shame,	Theatricality,	and	Queer	Performativity:	Henry	James’s	The	Art	of	the	Novel’	in	Touching	Feeling:	
Affect,	Pedagogy,	Performativity	(London	&	Durham,	Duke	University	Press,	2003:	35-66):	37.		
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tendency	of	modern	confession	is	rather	towards	identification	with	the	Law;38	modern	autobiography,	 instead	of	exemplifying	a	critical-philosophical	position	taken-up	 against	 the	 sophistry	 of	 the	 state,	 is	more	usually	 concerned	with	 an	aberrant	life,	which	has	to	somehow	be	written	or	spoken	out	of	existence.	This	 fate	 of	 philosophical	 ‘truth’	 imprisoned	within	 the	 neuroses	 of	 the	modern	 subject	 is	 detectable	 within	 life	 writing	 where	 the	 declarative	determination	 to	 be	 honest	 and	 artless	 is	 accompanied	 by	 the	 taint	 of	 self-aggrandizing	 vanity;	 most	 famously	 perhaps	 is	 the	 case	 of	 Rousseau’s	autobiographical	writings	–	his	Confessions	and	solitary	promenades	–		in	which	the	 political	 object	 of	 his	 unusually	 honest	 scrutiny	 becomes	 difficult	 to	distinguish	from	the	range	of	his	persecutory	identifications.	Recently,	Karl	Ove	Knausgaard’s	series	of	memoirs	My	Struggle	has	enjoyed	considerable	success	by	describing	 in	 shame-filled	 terms	 the	 author’s	 attempt	 to	 escape	 his	 shame	through	 writing	 about	 it.39		 The	 separation	 of	 this	 work	 from	 classical	 risky	speech	 is	manifest:	 sick	with	 the	conceit	of	 literary	 fiction,	Knausgaard	doesn’t	write	to	reveal	his	life	as	exemplary	or	even	‘interesting’,	but	rather	to	declare	it	an	unusually	wounded	one.	Often	throughout	the	volumes	he	abruptly	interrupts	the	 flow	of	his	 conventional	memoiristic	 accounts	of	 the	past	 to	 take	us	 to	 the	present-tense	 scene	 of	 authorship:	 the	 writer	 sitting	 at	 his	 desk	 engaged	 in	writing	what	we	are	reading:	 ‘It	 is	now	a	 few	minutes	past	eight	o’clock	 in	 the	morning.	It	is	the	fourth	of	March,	2008.	I	am	sitting	in	my	office,	surrounded	by	books	 from	floor	 to	ceiling,	 listening	to	 the	Swedish	band	Dungen	and	thinking	about	 what	 I	 have	 written	 and	 where	 it	 is	 leading.’40 	In	 other	 words,	 the	narrative	 fabric	 unravels,	 denuding	 the	 author	 of	 narrative	 certainty	 while	sticking	to	the	necessity	of	his	subject	matter.	What	is	thematically	necessary	for	
																																																								38	In	his	 lectures	on	 ‘The	Courage	of	Truth’,	Foucault	 identifies	 the	 transformation	of	parrhēsia	within	Christian	discourse,	wherein,	most	tellingly,	parrhēsia	came	to	mean,	as	well	as	critique,	a	confidence	and	open	heartedness	toward	God;	a	‘trembling	obedience’	in	the	mode	of	confession.	Michel	 Foucault,	 The	 Courage	 of	 Truth:	 The	 Government	 of	 Self	 and	 Others	 II,	 Lectures	 at	 the	
Collège	 de	 France	 1983-1984.	 Edited	 by	 F.	 Gros	 and	 translated	 by	 G.	 Burchell.	 (Basingstoke,	Palgrave:	2011):	332-333.	39See	 the	 following	Guardian	piece	 from	2015	 for	 a	discussion	of	Knausgaard’s	 conviction	 that	‘writing	is	a	way	of	getting	rid	of	shame’:		(https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/mar/01/karl-ove-knausgaard-interview-shame-dancing-in-the-dark).	40	Karl	 Ove	 Knausgaard,	My	 Struggle,	 Vol.	 1:	 A	Death	 in	 the	 Family.	Translated	 by	 Don	 Bartlett	(London,	Vintage	Books:	2013):	24.		
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Knausgaard,	 the	 self	 to	which	 he	 returns,	 is	 also	 necessarily	 a	 de-formation	 of	plot.	As	he	puts	it	most	programmatically	towards	the	end	of	Volume	2:		 Over	 recent	 years	 I	 had	 increasingly	 lost	 faith	 in	 literature.	 I	 read	and	thought	this	is	something	someone	has	made	up.	[…]	Living	like	this,	with	the	certainty	that	everything	could	equally	well	have	been	different,	drove	you	to	despair.	I	couldn’t	write	like	this,	it	wouldn’t	work,	every	single	 sentence	was	met	with	 the	 thought:	but	you’re	just	making	this	up.	It	has	no	value.	[…]	The	only	genres	I	saw	value	in,	which	still	conferred	meaning,	were	diaries	and	essays,	the	types	of	 literature	 that	did	not	deal	with	narrative,	 that	were	not	 about	anything,	 but	 just	 consisted	 of	 a	 voice,	 the	 voice	 of	 your	 own	personality,	a	life,	a	face,	a	gaze	you	could	meet.	What	is	a	work	of	art	 if	 not	 the	 gaze	 of	 another	 person?	Not	 directed	 above	 us,	 nor	beneath	us,	but	at	the	same	height	as	our	own	gaze.	Art	cannot	be	experienced	 collectively,	 nothing	 can,	 art	 is	 something	 you	 are	alone	with.	You	meet	its	gaze	alone.41			Here	we	can	see	how	the	author’s	stipulation	against	fiction,	and	his	narcissistic	itemizing	of	his	own	life,	though	not	inviting	emulation	on	ethical	grounds,	may	yet	be	deemed	exemplary	as	a	mode	of	singularising	the	self.		Famously,	Deleuze	expressed	 a	 similar	 ambition	 in	 his	 essay	 ‘Literature	 and	 Life’:	 ‘The	 shame	 of	being	a	man	–	is	there	any	better	reason	to	write?’	For	Deleuze,	true	writing	must	accept	 the	 challenge	 of	 becoming	 other	 than	 man:	 ‘in	 writing,	 one	 becomes-woman,	 becomes-animal	 or-vegetable,	 becomes-molecule’. 42 	Contemporary	strategies	 of	 shamelessness,	 distantly	 related	 to	 the	 Cynicism	 of	 Diogenes,	though	less	objectively	critical,	exist	 in	order	to	corrupt	pre-existent	or	generic	cultural	 narratives,	 which	 are	 seen	 as	 the	 representative	 forms	 of	 manhood	(standing	in	for	the	phallus,	symbolic	power,	and	so	on).	Accordingly,	the	value	of	 a	 confession	 such	 as	 Knausgaard’s,	 which	 aspires	 through	 shame	 to																																																									41	Karl	Ove	Knausgaard,	My	Struggle,	Vol	2:	A	Man	in	Love.	Translated	by	Don	Bartlett	 (London,	Vintage	Books:	2013):	496-7.		42	Gilles	 Deleuze,	 ‘Literature	 and	 Life’	 translated	 by	 Daniel	 W.	 Smith	 and	 Michael	 A.	 Greco	 in	
Critical	Inquiry,	Vol.23,	No.2	(Winter,	1997),	225-230:	225.	
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shamelessness,	 is	 that	 it	permits,	 in	Deleuze’s	 terms,	 for	 life	 to	be	 ‘singularized	out	 of	 a	 population	 rather	 than	 determined	 in	 a	 form’	 –	 it	 attempts,	 in	 other	words,	to	escape	‘its	own	formalization’.43	This	 view	 is	 an	 affirmative	 one,	 and	 characteristically	 modernist	 in	 its	commitment	 to	 the	non-preexistent.	However,	while	we	may	want	 to	celebrate	any	 such	 means	 of	 confronting	 ‘the	 shame	 of	 being	 a	 man’,	 especially	 if	 it	promises	 a	 reconfiguration	 of	 the	 body	 through	 language,	 therefore	disrupting	the	reproduction	of	symbolic	power;	we	must	also	concede	that	we	are,	initially	at	 least	 (as	 is	obvious	 from	 the	 record	of	Deleuze’s	examples,	 including	Witold	Gombrowicz,	 J.M.G.	Le	Clézio,	André	Dhôtel,	D.H.	Lawrence,	 and	Kafka)	writing	only	of	men.	There	is	indeed	a	long	line	of	‘honest	men’,	from	Augustine	through	Montaigne	 to	Rousseau	and	Knausgaard,	who	have	been	granted	 the	 license	 to	deconstruct	 the	 edifice	 of	 their	 cultural	 authority	 as	 men.	 Consequently,	 their	detailed	abjections	have	been	more	easily	transformed	into	spiritual	virtues.	Just	as	the	humility	of	reading	many	books	(an	academic	modesty	borrowed	from	the	poets)	 can	 translate	 into	 the	 institutional	 fame	 of	 being	 ‘well	 read’,	 so	 the	humiliations	 of	 failure,	 specifically	 the	 failure	 to	 write,	 can	 transform	 into	canonicity	 (see	 the	 remarkable	 case	 of	 Samuel	 Beckett).	 A	 woman	 writer,	 by	contrast,	 seldom	 granted	 the	 same	 historical	 prestige,	 is	 also	 often	 denied	 the	terms	of	a	heroic	contest	with	authority.	As	feminist	scholars	continue	to	remind	us,	 not	 only	 has	 much	 female	 memoir	 been	 precipitously	 understood	 as	‘hysterical’,	 and	 in	 this	 way	 denied	 a	 priori	 the	 dignity	 of	 ‘truth’,	 but	 female	writing	 –	 as	 reflected	 on	 by	Woolf	 and	 Hélène	 Cixous	 among	 others	 –	 is	 less	acquainted,	whether	by	circumstance	or	design,	with	the	prospect	of	escape.		Shamelessness,	 or	 the	 ridding	 of	 oneself	 of	 neurosis,	 Freud	 once	suggested,	 is	something	more	often	met	with	among	men	–	a	statement	replete	with	 	 implications	 for	 female	 authorship:	 if	 women	 are	 thought	 incapable	 of	working	 through	 their	 shame,	 then	what	 they	write	 of	 themselves	 can	only	be	treated	as	evidence	of	a	pathological	condition	(indeed	the	Freudian	association	of	shame	with	‘genital	deficiency’	is	hard	to	separate	from	its	characterization	as	
																																																								43	Ibid.:	225-6.	
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‘a	 feminine	 characteristic	 par	 excellence’).44	It	 is	 worth	 pondering	 the	 force	 of	such	 a	 preconception	 once	 more	 as	 we	 reanimate	 our	 argument	 that	 shame	attends	every	act	of	writing,	as	a	necessity,	but	also	a	strategy.	We	might	further	infer	that	shame	is	an	historical	device	which	entraps	a	woman	just	as	soon	as	it	exposes	a	man	in	the	foolhardy	presumption	of	transgression	or	escape.45	If	 it’s	true	that	shame	adheres	to	all	bodies	that	write,	then	even	a	cursory	look	at	the	record	of	what	gets	published	and	how	tells	us	that	shame	does	not	adhere	to	all	writing	bodies	in	the	same	way.		
Historicizing	Shame	For	 Liz	 Constable	 shame	 presents	 a	 ‘vicissitudinous	 ethics’	 of	 community;	 for	Christopher	 Lebron	 it	 poses	 a	 re-alignment	 of	 method	 when	 thinking	 about	political	 justice;	 Jennifer	 Biddle	 conceives	 of	 shame	 as	 the	 problem	 of	anthropological	 looking,	 whilst	 it	 remains	 ‘an	 arm	 of	 the	 law’	 for	 Martha	Nussbaum,	 and	 an	 old	 tool	 for	 Jennifer	 Jacquet,	 though	 with	 potentially	 new	uses.46	According	to	David	Halperin	and	Valerie	Traub,	shame	is	 ‘the	otherwise’	of	gay	pride;	for	Francis	Broueck	(quoted	approvingly	by	Sedgwick	and	Frank)	it	is	‘the	keystone	affect’	in	self-psychology;	and	for	the	sociologist	Thomas	Scheff	it	is	 ‘the	master-emotion	of	everyday	 life’.47	Timothy	Bewes	reads	colonial	shame	as	the	cultural	form	that	helps	us	think	the	absence	of	forms;	whilst	for	Giorgio	
																																																								44	Though	we	would	do	well	to	note	that	the	offending	line	from	Freud’s	1933	lecture	‘Femininity’	allows	 the	 cultural	 forces	 of	 ‘convention’	 to	 stand	 alongside	 anything	 that	 could	 be	 called	feminine	essence:	‘Shame,	which	is	considered	to	be	a	feminine	characteristic	par	excellence	but	is	 far	 more	 a	 matter	 of	 convention	 than	 might	 be	 supposed,	 has	 as	 its	 purpose,	 we	 believe,	concealment	 of	 genital	 deficiency.’	 Sigmund	 Freud,	 ‘Femininity’. The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII (1932-1936): New Introductory 
Lectures on Psycho-Analysis and Other Works, 1-182: 132. 45	For	recent	exploration	of	gendered	shame	see	The	Female	Face	of	Shame.	Eds.	Erica	L.	Johnson	and	Patricia	Moran.	(Bloomington	&	Indianapolis,	Indiana	University	Press:	2003).		46	Liz	Constable,	 ‘Shame’	in	MLN.	Vol.	112,	No.	4	(1997:	641-665):	643;	Christopher	Lebron,	The	
Color	 of	 Our	 Shame:	 Race	 and	 Justice	 in	Our	 Time.	 (New	 York,	 Oxford	 University	 Press:	 2013);	Jennifer	Biddle,	‘Shame’	in	Australian	Feminist	Studies,	Vol.	12,	No.	26	(1997:	227-239);	Martha	C.	Nussbaum,	Hiding	from	Humanity:	Disgust,	Shame	and	the	Law.	(Princeton,	New	Jersey,	Princeton	University	 Press:	 2004);	 Jennifer	 Jacquet.	 Is	Shame	Necessary?	New	Uses	 for	an	Old	Tool.	(Allen	Lane,	Penguin	Random	House:	2015).		47	David	 M.	 Halperin	 &	 Valerie	 Traub,	 ‘Beyond	 Gay	 Pride’,	 in	 Gay	 Shame	 Edited	 by	 David	 M.	Halperin	 &	 Valerie	 Traub.	 (Chicago,	 The	 University	 of	 Chicago	 Press,	 2009:	 3-40):	 3;	 Francis	Broueck,	‘Shame	and	Its	Relationship	to	Early	Narcissistic	Developments’	in	International	Journal	
of	 Psycho-Analysis,	 Vol.	 63	 (1982:	 369-378):	 369	 (cited	 in	 Sedgwick	 and	 Frank,	 Op.	 cit.:	 6);	Thomas	Scheff,	‘Shame	in	Self	and	Society’	in	Symbolic	Interaction,	Vol.	26.	No.	2	(2003:	239-262):	239.		
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Agamben	shame	marks	a	bearing	witness	to	our	own	passivity	when	confronted	with	the	inhuman	reductions	of	bio-political	regimes.48		We	have	already	suggested	some	reasons	why	shame	might	have	risen	to	such	 prominence	 in	 recent	 years,	 but	 equally	 significant	 is	 the	 comparative	retreat	 of	 the	 term	 guilt.	 The	 old	 complaint	 that	 psychoanalysis,	 for	 example,	treats	of	guilt	but	not	of	shame	–	in	other	words	that	it	neglects	the	body	-	might	now	be	reversed:	where	is	guilt	in	the	face	of	so	many	shame	publications?	This	deserves	 some	 further	 thought;	 because	 if	 focusing	 on	 shame	 indicates	 a	progressive	acknowledgement	that	sovereign	laws,	their	means	of	adjudication,	depend	upon	prior	mechanisms	of	inclusion	and	exclusion,	as	well	as	processes	of	identification	and	interpellation,	and	that	the	‘human’	scale	of	their	operation	belies	 the	 inhuman	determinations	of	material	history	(capitalism),	 then	 it	also	suggests	a	return,	a	backsliding	we	might	say,	from	the	law-abiding	citizen	to	the	question	 of	 personal	 character.	 Shame	 attaches	 to	 characters,	 not	 citizens.	 By	way	 of	 illustration	 we	 might	 introduce	 two	 character-types	 met	 with	 in	 the	contemporary	socio-political	landscape,	both	of	whom	call	forth	the	question	of	shame	 in	 a	 way	 that	 seems	 to	 take	 precedence	 from	 the	 question	 of	 guilt	 or	innocence:	 the	stateless	migrant	and	 the	whistleblower.	 	Both	 these	characters	are	 familiar	 figures	of	excess:	 the	 former	as	 the	constitutive	outsider	of	 settled	convention	 who	 bears	 the	 burden	 of	 selfhood	 in	 excess	 of	 any	 measured	distribution	 of	 social	 affect	 (to	 be	without	 papers	 is	 to	 be	 all	 body);	 the	 latter	because	she	reveals	the	inconsistency	of	the	system	to	which	she	belongs.	Both	are	 also	 figures	 of	 shame,	 shamed	 and	 shaming,	 who,	 we’d	 suggest,	 are	complementary	 in	 so	 far	 as	 they	 reveal	 together	 how	 the	 ordinary	 function	 of	institutional	or	state	power	purveys	shame	whilst	remaining	shameless	in	itself.	For	 our	 present	 purposes	 it	 is	 also	 worth	 noting	 that	 whistleblowing	 is	 most	often	an	act	of	writing	or	re-writing,	carrying	the	insider	language	of	institutions	across	 an	 established	 border.	 However	 contested	 the	 legacies	 of	 Edward	Snowden,	 Julian	Assange	or	Chelsea	Manning	remain,	each	character,	 though	in	very	 different	 ways,	 has	 borne	 the	 burden	 of	 their	 actions	 as	 whistleblowers,	embodying	a	tragic	statelessness	in	stark	contrast	to	the	bodiless	language	of	the																																																									48	Timothy	Bewes,	The	Event	of	Postcolonial	Shame.	(Princeton,	New	Jersey,	Princeton	University	Press:	2011);	Giorgio	Agamben,	‘Shame,	or	On	the	Subject’	in	Remnants	of	Auschwitz:	The	Witness	
and	the	Archive.	Translated	by	Daniel	Heller-Roazen	(New	York,	Zone	Books,	2002:	87-136).			
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institutions	 they	 opposed.	 Such	 an	 exorcism	 of	 institutional	 bad	 faith,	 by	 no	means	 identical	 to	 the	 migrant	 experience	 of	 being	 involuntarily	 outcast	 or	destitute,	 does	 at	 least	 adjoin	 that	 experience;	 it	 brings	 shame	 to	 shame	 and	enters	into	a	relation	with	the	other	who	is	outside	and	not	allowed	in,	the	other	who	 has	 to	 bear	 the	 burden	 of	 the	 self	 without	 any	 guarantee	 of	 legal	representation.		Rob	Halpern’s	recent	poetry	collection	Commonplace	(2015)	exercises	the	dangerous	 prerogative	 of	 the	 whistleblower.	49	Throughout	 the	 collection	 the	poet	performatively	transcribes	the	autopsy	of	Al	Hanashi	Muhammad	Ahmad,	a	detainee	of	the	Guantánamo	Bay	holding	facility	who	died	with	a	ligature	around	his	neck	 in	2009.	Halpern	copies	 the	 institutional	 language	which	 incarcerated,	taxonomised	and	ultimately	mortified	Al	Hanashi’s	body	(‘Autopsy	No	(b)	(6).	ID	
No.	 (b)	 (6).’),	 contaminating	 this	 language	 with	 his	 own	 supplementary	reflections,	and,	inevitably	in	the	process,	carrying	it	over	and	out	of	its	‘proper’	context.50	The	work	reads	as	an	attempt	to	feel	impersonal	language	personally,	an	effect	mostly	achieved	through	the	sexualisation	of	the	institutional	register.	An	example:		 Ligature:	The	 ligature	 is	 collected	as	 evidence	by	 the	NCIS	 at	 the	 scene	and	 examined	 by	 the	 prospector	 and	 the	 observing	 civilian	 medical	examiner	prior	to	autopsy.	The	ligature	is	almost	identical	to	the	elastic	band	of	a	white	brief,	medium	size	34-36,	issued	to	the	detainees	at	the	detention	facility.	The	ligature	consists	of	two	segments,	with	a	combined	aggregate	length	of	approximately	23½"	and	width	of	approximately	1".	The	 smaller	 of	 the	 two	 segment	measures	 6½"	 in	 length.	 The	 ligature	fibers	 are	 elongated	 and	 distorted	 at	 the	 junction	 of	 the	 two	 cut	 edges	c/w	the	history	of	cutting	 the	 ligature	at	 the	 twisted	part.	There	are	no	bloodstains	on	the	ligature.	Boredom	distracts	and	numbness	disorients,	but	arriving	at	that	period	I	become	acutely	aware	of	my	body	as	I	write.	
																																																								49	Rob	 Halpern,	 Common	 Place.	 (Brooklyn,	 New	 York,	 Ugly	 Duckling	 Presse:	 2015).	 We	 are	grateful	to	Marc	Botha	for	this	connection.		50	Ibid.	32.		
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The	 word	 “ligature”	 excites	 me	 and	 my	 left	 hand	 begins	 caressing	 my	thigh.51		The	immeasurability	of	Halpern’s	desire,	its	proper	to	improper	border-crossing	here,	addresses	 in	Al	Hanashi	someone	doubly	removed	 from	the	possibility	of	communication:	a	figure	of	migration	detained	outside	the	law,	and	a	man	who	is	dead.	Nonetheless	he	also	conjures	an	awkward	physical	intimacy:	 ‘It	makes	no	sense	 for	 my	 hard-on	 to	 shame	 me,	 opposing	 the	 stiffness	 of	 his	 body’.52	Halpern’s	 language,	ethically	perilous	as	a	conscious	admission	of	complicity	 in	the	exploitation	of	the	silenced	other,	and	vulnerable	to	censure	on	the	grounds	that	 it	 expresses	 narcissistic	 pathology	 rather	 than	 political	 or	 philosophical	truth,	 exhibits	 a	 short-circuited	 relation	 which	 can	 only	 raise	 the	 ‘senseless’	prospect	of	 shame:	 a	 repeated	 interest	which	 repeatedly	 falls	 short	of	meeting	with	its	object.	‘This	is	not	a	wet	dream,	it’s	a	poem,	and	I	want	to	believe	it	needs	to	 be	 written,	 not	 simply	 that	 it	 can	 be.	 But	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 my	 writing	sublimes	 in	 private	 yearning	 is	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 it	 yields	 to	 civic	embarrassment’. 53 	The	 shameful	 necessity	 of	 Al	 Hanashi’s	 fate,	 its	 literal	inescapability,	 shames	 the	 gratuitousness	 of	 Halpern’s	 voluntary	 act	 of	transcription:	 they	 relate	 according	 to	 a	 conspicuous,	 unbridgeable	 difference.	No	matter	how	the	poet	wishes	for	the	necessity	of	a	muse,	the	impersonality	of	the	work	 to	provide	 the	 formal	alibi	 for	his	writerly	ambition,	he	 is	 recalled	 to	the	embarrassing	inadequacy	of	his	identifications.		Halpern’s	project	as	a	writer	is	also	of	course	a	readerly	one,	reading	into	and	 implicitly	 against	 the	 institutional	 languages	 which	 organize	 Al	 Hanashi’s	body.	 If	 the	 institution	 shames	 its	 object	 by	 reproducing	 it	 as	 a	 knowable,	quantifiable	entity,	the	critical	and	poetic	response	is	to	ask	how	the	institution	can	be	made	to	feel	or	recognize	its	own	shame,	beyond	merely	delegating	it	to	a	scapegoat.	 Halpern’s	 historical	 coordinates	 include	 the	 recent	 American	 wars	and	 other	 illicit	 involvements	 in	 Iraq,	 Afghanistan	 and	 elsewhere;	 but	 his	indictment	 of	 institutional	 impersonality	 –	 fixing	 the	 body	 biometrically,	 and	constricting	 its	 narrative	 possibilities	 to	 the	 zero-point	 where	 an	 an	 autopsy																																																									51	Ibid.:	23.	52	Ibid.:	31.	53	Ibid.:	137-8.	
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becomes	its	most	apt	expression	–	is	general.	There	is	a	point	of	apposition	here	between	 the	dilemmas	of	 the	poetic	 ‘I’,	 and	 the	 figure	of	 the	blush	as	a	 sign	of	excessive	subjectivity	falling	short	of	plot	or	historical	narrative.	We	might	say	of	Halpern’s	 ‘lyric’	 mode	 that	 it	 performs	 the	 experience	 too-much	 face	 when	confronting	the	involuntary	and	faceless	deformations	of	the	world.		Famously	 Charles	 Darwin	 characterized	 the	 blush	 as	 ‘the	most	 peculiar	and	the	most	human	of	all	expressions’:	an	issue	of	subjectivity,	in	other	words.	Yet	 he	 also	 went	 on	 to	 explain	 it	 in	 objective	 terms	 as	 ‘the	 relaxation	 of	 the	muscular	coats	of	the	small	arteries,	by	which	the	capillaries	become	filled	with	blood;	and	this	depends	on	the	proper	vaso-motor	centre	being	affected.’54	The	blush,	 then,	 is	 biographical	 and	 biometric.	 But	 what	 Darwin	 doesn’t	 fully	investigate	 is	 how	 the	material	 triggers	 he	 describes	 are	 related	 to	 particular	psychical	 and	 historical	 representations:	 to	 what	 extent	 do	 fantasy	 and	imaginative	identification	overdetermine	the	manifest	phenomenon	of	a	red	face?	How	can	a	blush	be	known	if	 its	causes	are	endlessly	confused	with	 its	effects?		This	 confusion	 is	most	 evident	when	 the	 process	 of	 identifying	 the	 blush	 as	 a	material	 bodily	 phenomenon	 is	 shown	 to	 produce	 the	 humiliation	 it	 claims	 to	study,	as	in	the	following	quotation.		 [Dr	 J.	 Crichton	 Browne]	 gives	 me	 the	 case	 of	 a	 married	 woman,	 aged	twenty-seven,	 who	 suffered	 from	 epilepsy.	 On	 the	 morning	 after	 her	arrival	 in	 the	 Asylum,	 Dr.	 Browne,	 together	with	 his	 assistants,	 visited	her	whilst	she	was	in	bed.	The	moment	that	he	approached,	she	blushed	deeply	over	her	cheeks	and	temples;	and	the	blush	spread	quickly	to	her	ears.	She	was	much	agitated	and	tremulous.	He	unfastened	the	collar	of	her	 chemise	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	 state	 of	 her	 lungs;	 and	 then	 a	brilliant	 blush	 rushed	 over	 her	 chest,	 in	 an	 arched	 line	 over	 the	 upper	third	 of	 each	 breast,	 and	 extended	 downwards	 between	 the	 breasts	nearly	to	the	ensiform	cartilage	of	the	sternum.55																																																											54	Charles	Darwin,	‘Self-attention	–	Shame	–	Shyness	–	Modesty:	Blushing’	in	The	Expression	of	the	
Emotions	in	Man	and	Animals	(Chicago,	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1965	[1872]:	309-346):	309.	55	Ibid.:	313.	
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Sally	Munt	 has	 noted	 the	 soft	 pornographic	 imaginary	which	 underwrites	 this	passage	(‘agitated	and	tremulous’)	and	which	Darwin’s	scientific	literalism	is	not	in	 a	 position	 to	 reflect	 upon.	 However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 appreciate	 that	 the	objectifying	regard	of	Darwin	and	the	Doctor	in	this	scene	covers	over,	not,	as	we	might	naively	hope,	the	consoling	thought	of	an	equal	relation	between	subjects,	but	rather	the	space	where	this	relation	 is	not	 taking	place:	where	the	married	woman’s	blush	is	a	blazon	of	self-enclosure	and	mute	retreat.		In	 his	 essay	 ‘Shame,	 or	 On	 the	 Subject’,	 Giorgio	 Agamben	 transfers	 a	similar	 thought	 to	 the	 institution	of	 the	Nazi	death	camps.	We	have	considered	the	 blush	 of	 the	 writing	 subject	 who	 falls	 short	 of	 plot	 (Gwendolen’s	 ‘no	language’),	 and	 the	blush	of	 the	objectified	patient,	possibly	bearing	witness	 to	her	 own	 objectification	 (Darwin’s	 ‘married	 woman’).	 For	 Agamben,	 these	 two	positions	 together	 infiltrate	 the	 dilemmas	 of	 Holocaust	 testimony.	 His	paradigmatic	example	comes	from	Robert	Antelme’s	written	account	of	a	young	Italian	student	who	‘turned	pink’	after	being	interpellated	by	a	member	of	the	SS:	‘Du	komme	hier!’56	In	this	unforgettable	scene	Agamben	finds	the	‘I’	‘overcome	by	its	own	passivity’:	 the	student	has	entered	into	a	fundamental	relation	with	his	own	physiological	or	‘bare’	life.57	‘In	shame,	the	subject	[…]	has	no	other	content	than	its	own	desubjectivisation;	it	becomes	witness	to	its	own	disorder,	its	own	oblivion	as	a	subject.	This	double	movement	which	is	both	subjectivisation	and	desubjectivisation	 is	 shame’.58	Agamben	 generalizes	 this	moment	 –the	 bearing	witness	to	the	material	deformation	of	oneself-	so	that	not	only	is	it	paradigmatic	for	 all	 Holocaust	 testimony,	 but	 it	 captures	 in	 an	 especially	 vicious	 historical	circumstance	the	fundamental	task	undertaken	by	the	lyric	subject	of	poetry.	The	lyric	‘I’	offers	testimony	as	the	only	remainder	of	the	human	when	the	subject’s	humanity	has	been	deformed	or	destroyed.		We	might	wonder,	in	this	regard,	whether	the	unbearable	particularity	of	the	 Italian	 student’s	 case	 –	 his	 autopoiesis	 standing	 in	 excess	 of	 the	 historical	circumstance	 of	 mass	 extermination	 –	 really	 connects	 to	 the	 long	 tradition	 of	poetic	testimony	where,	according	to	Agamben,	the	language	of	shame	stands	in																																																									56	Giorgio	 Agamben,	 ‘Shame,	 or	 On	 the	 Subject’	 in	Remnants	of	Auschwitz:	The	Witness	and	 the	
Archive.	Translated	by	Daniel	Heller-Roazen	(New	York,	Zone	Books,	2002):	103.		57	Ibid.:	105.	58	Ibid.:	106.	
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the	place	of	a	‘missing	articulation’?59	Are	we	really	to	imagine	poetic	experiment	on	the	page	as	continuous	with	the	Italian	student’s	experience	when	confronted	with	 his	 own	 death?	 The	 Italian	 student	 doesn’t	 get	 to	 write	 his	 own	 poetry	(neither	did	Al	Hanashi);60	rather,	he	has	to	be	witnessed	witnessing	himself	by	Antelme,	 and	 therefore,	might	 be	 said	 to	mark	 less	 the	 exemplary	moment	 of	poetic	self-testimony,	than	its	crushing	defeat.	This	is	a	point	of	consternation	for	Ruth	 Leys	 in	 her	 2007	 study	 From	Guilt	 to	 Shame:	 Auschwitz	 and	After.61	Leys	suggests	 that	Agamben,	 as	well	 as	potentially	de-historicising	 the	 specificity	 of	what	 happened	 at	 Auschwitz,	 specifically	 misreads	 Antelme.	 For	 Antelme	 the	‘pink	face’	is	not	simply	the	phenomenological	mark	of	shame	–	a	subject	facing	desubjectivisation	 –	 but	 a	 textual	 sign	 transposed	 to	 other	 figures	 including	 at	one	point	to	a	German	baby,	signaling	‘aliveness	or	vitality’.62		In	other	words,	for	Leys	 it	 is	 significant	 that	 Antelme’s	 writerly	 strategies	 refuse	 the	 institutional	reduction	 which	 equates	 the	 pink	 face	 to	 humiliation:	 ‘Attention	 to	 Antelme’s	own	 thematisation	 of	 pink	 in	 the	 text	 suggests	 a	 different	 meaning,	 one	 that	emphasized	 not	 the	 issue	 of	 desubjectivisation	 and	 shame	 but	 of	 human	relatedness	and	responsibility’.63		This	is	part	of	Leys’s	larger	argument	against	shame	as	it	replaces	guilt	in	the	 discourse	 on	 Holocaust	 testimony.	 Shame,	 for	 Leys,	 indicates	 a	 turn	 away	from	complex	questions	of	complicity,	intentionality,	fantasy,	and	transference	–	all	 terms	 of	 linguistic	 inquiry	 which	 allow	 us	 to	 connect	 bearing	 witness	 to	‘survivor	guilt’	–	towards	what	she	calls	a	kind	of	biopolitical	literalism:	bearing	witness	to	oneself	as	pure	materiality	to	be	manipulated.		Agamben’s	reading	of	Antelme	 is	 a	 recent	 example	 of	 this	 turn	 according	 to	 Leys,	 inspired	 by	 the	(re)turn	to	affect	and	the	new	literalism	of	the	(anti-psychoanalytic)	materialism	
																																																								59	Ibid.:	134.	60	Though	 there	 is	 an	 emerging	 archive	 of	 Guantánamo	 poetry	 (see	 for	 example	 Poems	 from	
Guantánamo:	The	Detainees	Speak,	Edited	by	Mark	Falkoff	(University	of	Iowa	Press,	2007);	and	for	critical	commentary	on	such	an	archive,	Judith	Butler’s	Frames	of	War:	When	is	Life	Greivable?	(Verson	Books,	2009).			61	Ruth	 Leys,	From	Guilt	 to	Shame:	Auschwitz	and	After.	(Princeton,	 Princeton	University	 Press:	2007).		62	Ibid.:	178.	63	Ibid.:	176.	
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of	neuroscience.64	Writing	is	deprived	of	fantasy	in	this	register,	enacting	in	the	same	breath	a	return	to	Darwin	and	an	omission	of	Freud.		 Ley’s	argument	is	invaluable	to	us	for	two	reasons:	first,	it	demonstrates,	by	 the	 scope	of	 its	 genealogy	of	writing	 about	 the	Holocaust,	 the	 reality	of	 the	discursive	shift	from	guilt	to	shame.	Beginning	with	a	discussion	of	the	concept	of	 ‘survivor	 guilt’	 linked	 to	 ‘identification	 with	 the	 aggressor’,	 (suggested	 by	Bruno	Bettleheim	in	1943,	framed	by	William	G.	Niederland	in	the	early	1960s,	and	 articulated	 also	 in	 Primo	 Levi’s	 writings),	 Leys	 goes	 onto	 note	 that	 from	1979	on	writers	who	were	concerned	to	challenge	the	Freudian	underpinnings	to	 survivor	 guilt	 (especially	 the	 problematic	 implications	 of	 the	 victim’s	identification	with	 the	aggressor)	 turned	 to	shame	as	an	embodied,	materialist	alternative	 to	 the	 complexities	 of	 transference	 and	 fantasy.	 ‘There	 is	 a	marked	tendency	in	recent	trauma	theory	to	treat	the	traumatic	event	as	something	that	leaves	a	‘reality	imprint’	in	the	brain,’	she	writes	‘an	imprint	that	in	its	insistent	literality	 testifies	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 timeless	 historical	 truth	 unaffected	 by	suggestive-mimetic	 factors	 or	 unconscious-symbolic	 elaboration.’ 65 She	nominates	Terence	Des	Pres,	Lawrence	Langer,	as	well	as	Agamben,	as	writers	whose	work	has	extended	this	interpretation.			The	second	value	of	Leys’s	argument	is	how	her	account	of	guilt	as	both	‘suggestive-mimetic’	 and	 ‘unconscious-symbolic’	 usefully	 complicates	 the	 guilt-shame	distinction.	She	is	not	content	to	reproduce	the	commonplace	opposition	between	 shame	 as	 a	 bodily,	 ontological	 concern	with	 our	 being,	 and	 guilt	 as	 a	mental	 and	 moral	 concern	 with	 our	 deeds.	 Rather	 Leys	 defends	 guilt	 as	 an	
emotional	 descriptor	 underpinned	 by	 psychoanalytic	 theory,	 a	 theoretical	framework	which	insists	that	guilt	can	come	before	the	act,	and	that	feeling	guilty	can	be	revealed	as	a	cause	as	much	as	a	consequence	of	particular	deeds.	Indeed,	following	 the	 work	 of	 Herbert	 Fingarette,	 Leys	 defends	 a	 psychoanalytic	conception	 of	 guilt	 against	 existentialist	 philosopher	 Martin	 Buber	 who	considered	 the	 question	 of	 ‘real’	 guilt	 to	 be	 beyond	 the	 province	 of	psychoanalytic	 enquiry:	 ‘there	 exists	 real	 guilt,’	 Buber	 avers,	 ‘fundamentally																																																									64	For	the	broader	contours	of	Leys’s	critique,	see	her	 ‘The	Turn	to	Affect:	A	Critique’	 in	Critical	
Inquiry	Vol.	27,	No.3	(2011:	434-472).				65	Ruth	 Leys,	From	Guilt	 to	Shame:	Auschwitz	and	After.	(Princeton,	 Princeton	University	 Press:	2007):	60.	
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different	from	all	the	anxiety-induced	bug	bears	that	are	generated	in	the	cavern	of	 the	 unconscious’.66	For	 Buber,	 the	 moral	 destiny	 of	 man	 depends	 upon	 his	standing	 in	 an	 objective	 relation	 to	 others.	 The	 gendering	 of	 this	 heroic	transparency	 before	 the	 other	 is	 probably	 not	 insignificant:	 the	 active	 as	opposed	 to	 the	 neurotic	 mind,	 a	 legal	 reality	 as	 opposed	 to	 an	 unconscious	motive,	 a	 man	 standing	 objectively	 in	 the	 world	 as	 opposed	 to	 not-man	entangled,	 dependent,	 or	 embattled	 by	 the	 extent	 of	 their	 identifications	 with	and	through	others.	By	defending	guilt	on	the	basis	of	 its	emotional	complexity	rather	than	its	objective	facticity,	Leys	espouses	a	distinctively	modern	position.	As	 James	Brown	points	 out	 in	 this	 volume,	 it	was	 only	 towards	 the	 end	of	 the	nineteenth	century	–	coincident	with	the	rise	of	psychoanalysis	–	that	guilt	was	first	 defined	 in	 the	 OED	 as	 a	 feeling.	 Consequently,	 although	 Leys’s	 intention	seems	to	be	to	separate	guilt	from	shame	along	an	historical	axis,	and	make	the	case	for	the	moral	complexity	of	guilt	feelings	as	against	the	material	literalism	of	shame,	 she	 is	 also	 contributing	 to	 a	 broader	modern	discourse	 in	which	 it	 has	become	 more	 and	 more	 difficult	 to	 distinguish	 the	 ostensible	 facticity	 of	 the	former	 (guilty	 or	 not)	 from	 the	 affective	 intensity	 of	 latter.	 After	 all,	 the	discursive	 turn	 to	 shame,	 and	 the	 affect	 theory	 that	 underlies	 it,	 is	 not	 the	wholesale	rejection	of	psychoanalysis	which	Leys	depicts	 it	as	being;	rather,	as	noted	above,	Tomkins’s	mid-century	theory	of	 the	affects	drew	on	traditions	of	post-Freudian	 psychoanalytic	 writing	 which	 emphasized	 the	 pre-oedipal	mother-infant	 relation	 in	 particular.	 It	 may	 be,	 then,	 that	 instead	 of	 only	literalising	 the	 body	 and	 fixing	 the	wound	 temporally	 and	 spatially	 in	morally	unsophisticated	 ways,	 shame	 also	 points	 us	 towards	 even	 more	 complex	 and	disordered	identifications	unregulated	by	the	traditional	fable	of	Oedipal	contest	between	the	law	of	the	father	and	the	son.	It	 is	 not	 only	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	Holocaust	 testimony	 that	 the	 terms	 of	guilt	and	shame	have	been	disputed	and	conflated.	In	anthropology,	too,	shame	and	 guilt	 have	 been	 said	 to	 define	 particular	 cultural	 formations.	 	 Writing	 in	1936,	Margaret	Mead	found	only	two	of	what	she	called	 ‘guilt	cultures’	out	of	a	selection	 of	 thirteen	 distinct	 ‘primitive	 peoples’:	 two	 cultures,	 that	 is,	 whose																																																									66 	Martin	 Buber,	 ‘Guilt	 and	 Guilt	 Feelings’	 in	 Guilt	 and	 Shame.	 Edited	 by	 Herbert	 Morris	(California,	Wadsworth	Publishing	Company,	1971:59-81):	67.	
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ethos	 was	 competitive	 and/or	 individualistic	 (rather	 than	 cooperative)	 and	therefore	 closer	 to	 the	Western	 European	 form.67	The	 remaining	 eleven,	more	cooperative	 cultures	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 controlled	 by	 shame.	 A	 ‘shame	culture’,	 for	Mead,	 is	one	 in	which	 ‘the	 individual	 is	 controlled	by	 fear	of	being	shamed,	he	is	safe	if	no	one	knows	of	his	misdeed.’	In	guilt	cultures,	on	the	other	hand,	 the	 individual	must	 atone	 for	his	 taboo	deed	 in	order	 to	 ‘reestablish	 the	internal	balance	of	the	personality’.	Mead	is	careful	to	allow	that	shame	cultures	do	not	rely	exclusively	on	external	or	group	sanction:	shame	too,	she	writes,	‘can	be	 internalized	 within	 the	 individual	 mind’. 68 	But	 the	 distinction	 remains	categorical	 nonetheless,	 between	 a	 culture	 that	 believes	 in	 atonement	 –	 the	ability	 to	 exchange	 one	 deed	 for	 another	 –	 and	 a	 culture	 that	 believes	 in	 the	humiliation	of	character.	The	most	famous	amplification	of	Mead’s	distinction	is	Ruth	Benedict’s	work	of	1946,	The	Chrysanthemum	and	the	Sword,	a	text	which,	even	as	it	was	produced	on	a	war-footing,	tasked	with	accounting	for	the	psyche	of	 America’s	 enemy,	 the	 Japanese,	 is	 careful	 not	 to	 attribute	 to	 its	 general	distinction	between	shame	and	guilt	cultures	the	status	of	incompatibility.	Both	Mead	and	Benedict,	 it	must	be	 said,	 though	determining	a	 contrast	 and	even	a	contest	 in	 Benedict’s	 case	 between	 shame	 and	 guilt,	 also	 rely	 on	 the	 modern	convergence	between	the	two	terms:	to	speak	of	a	guilt	culture,	after	all,	allows	that	guilt	is	felt	and	expressed	rather	than	simply	adjudicated.	Perhaps	it	should	not	 surprise	 us	 that	 a	 conceptual	 opposition	 bellies	 some	 deeper	 ideological	historical	 confusion,	 but	 it	 remains	 noteworthy	 nonetheless.	 For	 example,	Benedict’s	 historically	 incentivized	 research	 question	why	 do	 the	 Japanese	 not	
surrender?	 is	 answered	 according	 to	 the	 dictates	 of	 shame:	 to	 surrender	 for	 a	Japanese	soldier	would	be	to	wear	an	ineradicable	stain	on	one’s	character.	The	American	soldier	feels	less	shame	at	being	captured.	The	implication	is	that	the	American	soldier	can	forgive	himself	his	capture	because	he	knows	a	future	deed	is	able	to	atone	for	 it.	Underlying	this	 interpretation,	however,	 is	the	additional	premise	that	the	American	soldier	is	able	to	treat	his	own	captivity	impersonally,	because	he	has,	according	to	the	structure	of	a	guilt	culture,	abstracted	himself	from	his	own	experience.	By	implication	at	least,	he	understands	himself	to	be	a																																																									67	Margaret	 Mead,	 ‘Interpretive	 Statement’	 in	 Cooperation	 and	 Competition	 Amoung	 Primitive	
Peoples.	Edited	by	Margaret	Mead	(Boston,	Beacon	Press:	548-515):	494.		68	Ibid.	
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unit	 of	 capital	 for	 exchange	 in	 an	 economy	 indebtedness,	 and	 therefore	 bears	less	 personal	 responsibility	 for	 his	 fate.	 We	 can	 discern	 in	 this	 example	 an	unstated	 convergence	 between	 Benedict’s	 understanding	 of	 guilt	 culture	 and	Nietzschean	 and	Weberian	 analyses	 of	 modern	 capitalism’s	 structural	 alliance	with	 Christianity.	 Considering	 the	 political	 asymmetry	 which	 underlies	Benedict’s	 guilt-shame	 opposition	 (remember	 American	 guilt	 culture	 has	 just	emerged	 victorious	 from	 war),	 and	 the	 soft	 imperialism	 never	 far	 from	 the	surface	 of	 her	 project,	 it	 is	 not	 difficult	 to	 read	 beneath	 the	 guise	 of	characterizing	guilt	culture	as	favoured	for	its	dynamic	means	of	atoning	for	past	sins,	 a	 handbook	 for	 the	 expansion	 of	 global	 markets.	 Benedict	 professes	admiration	 for	 the	discipline	and	self-care	of	 the	average	 Japanese,	but	equally	she	praises	the	cunning	of	General	McArthur	for	how	he	has	managed	to	flatter	traditional	 Japanese	 attitudes	 the	 better	 to	 succeed	 with	 a	 modern	 political	occupation.	Instead	of	being	a	conceptual	distinction,	in	other	words,	the	shame-guilt	 contest	 is	 fundamentally	 ideological,	with	 the	 former	 standing	 in	 for	non-capitalist	 or	 ‘primitive’	 cultures,	 posing	 the	 problem	 of	 assimilation,	 and	 the	latter	for	a	dynamic	and	expressive	modernity.	 	Read	in	this	light,	the	title	of	our	volume	will	seem	oxymoronic:	the	more	pertinent	pairing	would	be	guilt	and	modern	writing.	Certainly,	 this	 is	how	E.R.	Dodds	 extrapolated	 from	 the	Mead-Benedict	 tradition	 in	his	 1951	 study	of	 the	Ancient	Greeks.69	What	separates	us	Moderns	from	the	culture	of	Sophocles	and	Euripides,	 contends	 Dodds,	 is	 the	 essential	 difference	 between	 our	 guilt,	 and	Greek	shame.	We	might	want	to	be	careful	about	endorsing	such	an	‘us	and	them’	formulation,	however,	because	 it	has	 evolved	by	means	of	 an	alliance	between	anthropological	 scholarship	 and	 post-war	 realpolitik,	 and	 also	 because	 such	categorical	 distinctions	 belie	 the	 contaminations	 of	 anthropological	 practice.	Jennifer	Biddle	puts	 it	well	 in	 reference	 to	her	work	with	 the	Warlpiri	 people:	‘anthropologists	 intentionally	 put	 themselves	 in	 the	 out-of-place,	 in	 the	wrong	place,	 and	 thus,	 the	 place	 occupied	 by	 shame.	 Even	 if	 it	 is	 never	 taught	 in	undergraduate	courses,	this	is	the	first	principle	of	the	ethnographer’s	sensibility	
																																																								69	E.R.	 Dodds,	 The	 Greeks	 and	 the	 Irrational.	 (Los	 Angeles,	 California,	 University	 of	 California	Press:	1951).		
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[…]	 Field	 work,	 like	 shame,	 exalts	 self-difference’.70		 Notwithstanding	 the	 fact	that	 Benedict	 carried	 out	 no	 field	work	when	writing	The	Chrysanthemum	and	
the	 Sword	 –	 many	 of	 her	 major	 Japanese	 informants	 were	 acculturated	Americans	–	Biddle’s	point	is	wholly	pertinent	to	the	shame	culture	discourse.	If	the	anthropologist’s	major	transgression	is	that	of	not	 looking	away	(a	writerly	transgression	 too	we	might	 surmise),	 then	 the	discourse	which	 formalizes	 and	legitimizes	the	gaze	is	stimulating	the	shame	it	claims	to	uncover.	In	this	context	Ukai	 Satoshi	 has	 written	 of	 the	 self-perpetuating	 identification	 of	 Japan	 as	 a	‘shame	 culture’:	 Japan	 enters	 our	 globalized	 modernity	 with	 this	 reductive	characteristic,	known	even	to	itself	through	such	mediations	from	abroad.71	But	for	Biddle	there	can	be	no	atavistic	retreat	behind	borders	where	one	cannot	be	seen;	it	is	not	simply	that	anthropologists	should	be	ashamed	of	themselves	and	desist	with	 their	practice,	but	 rather	 that	 they	should	acknowledge	shame	as	a	way	 of	 addressing	 institutional	 impunity	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 knowledge	production,	 and	 interrogate	 the	 always	 personal	 experience	 of	 shame’s	projective,	mimetic	and	contagious	characteristics.		Bernard	Williams	is	another	writer	who	has	disputed	the	tidiness	of	 the	shame-guilt	distinction.	Though	not	an	ideology	critic,	and	in	some	sense	offering	a	 belated	 response	 to	 E.R.	 Dodds,	 the	 major	 point	 of	 Williams’s	 argument	 in	
Shame	and	Necessity72	is	 to	 challenge	 the	unhistorical	privileging	of	 guilt	 in	 the	modern	period.73	Williams	finds	lodged	within	the	Greek	term	aidōs,	(for	Dodds	the	signifier	of	ancient	shame),	values	which	have	become	associated	with	guilt,	including	 indignation,	 reparation	 and	 forgiveness.74	If	 the	 ancients	 combined	aspects	 of	 both	 guilt	 and	 shame,	 Williams	 surmises,	 then	 our	 modern	 guilt	culture	must	 also	 contain	 aspects	 of	 shame.	 Indeed,	 if	we	want	 to	 give	 the	 full	picture	of	our	ethical	lives	we	must	make	the	effort	to	countenance	shame.	What																																																									70	Jennifer	Biddle,	Op.	cit.:	232.	71	Ukai	 Satoshi,	 ‘The	 Future	 of	 an	 Affect:	 The	 Historicity	 of	 Shame’	 in	 Traces:	 A	 Multilingual	
Journal	 of	 Cultural	 Theory.	 Edited	 by	 Naoki	 Sakai	 and	 Yukiko	 Hanawa	 (Ithaca,	 NY:	 Cornell	University,	 Distributed	 by	 Hong	 Kong	 University	 Press,	 2001:	 3-36).	 We	 are	 grateful	 to	 Geoff	Gilbert	for	bringing	this	coordinate	to	our	attention.		72	Bernard	 Williams,	 Shame	 and	 Necessity.	 (California,	 University	 of	 California	 Press:	 2008	[1993]).		73	As	Williams	puts	it:	‘The	mere	fact	that	we	have	two	words	does	not,	in	itself,	imply	that	there	is	any	great	psychological	difference	between	shame	and	guilt.’	(Ibid.:	89).	It	is	significant	in	light	of	our	previous	discussion	that	for	Williams	shame	and	guilt	are	both	feelings	–	or	psychological	states	–	and,	what’s	more,	feelings	that	may	prove	difficult	if	not	impossible	to	distinguish.	74	Ibid.:	90-1.	
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is	 intriguing	 reading	 Williams’s	 work	 today,	 which	 converges	 upon	 a	 dispute	with	a	strict	Kantian	belief	 in	the	autonomy	of	the	subject	acting	 in	accordance	with	 a	 universalisable	 moral	 principle,	 is	 how	 the	 conclusion	 that	 shame	 and	guilt	 cannot	 be	 kept	 decisively	 apart	 –	 either	 historically	 or	 psychologically	 –becomes	itself	a	kind	of	ethical	content.		So,	for	example,	considering	the	primacy	of	guilt	as	it	turns	us	‘towards	victims’	–	enquiring	about	the	harm	done	to	others	and	 the	 terms	of	 reparation	–	Williams	points	out	how	such	a	guilt	morality	 is	only	equipped	 to	weigh	voluntary	or	 conscious	actions.	Only	 shame,	he	writes,	can	consider	times	when	personal	failings	played	a	role	in	harming	others	where	no	harm	was	consciously	intended.	Only	shame	can	square	up	to	the	involuntary	or	 unconsciously	motivated	 consequences	 of	 action,	 actions	which	 seem	more	born	 of	 necessity	 than	 will.	 Thus,	 he	 writes,	 ‘shame	 can	 understand	 guilt,	 but	guilt	 cannot	 understand	 itself’.75		 Another	 way	 of	 putting	 this	 might	 be	 that	shame	 is	 a	necessary	 supplement	 to	guilt.	Of	 course,	 its	 concern	with	personal	character,	situated	within	a	world	of	heteronomous	attachments	to	others,	who	bear	witness	 to	 the	self,	 conveying	esteem	and	disappointment,	 can	be	 read	as	narcissistic	 when	 pitched	 against	 the	 ideal	 of	 guilt	 culture:	 other-directed	concern	 for	 the	victim.	Yet	as	Williams	concludes	 in	 the	postscript	 to	his	book,	once	‘guilt	comes	to	represented	simply	as	the	attitude	of	respect	for	an	abstract	law’76	–	 	 removed	 in	other	words	 from	consideration	of	personal	 anger	or	 fear	which	produces	actions	and	potentially	victims,	then	its	other-directed	virtue	is	devoid	 of	 intimacy	 and	 sunk	 by	 its	 inflated	 estimation	 of	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	rational	 autonomous	 mind	 to	 hold	 a	 moral	 purview	 of	 the	 world.77	Put	 more	bluntly	than	Williams	puts	 it:	a	principle	of	 justice	once	historically	reified	as	a	universal	 cultural	 value	 can	 be	 used	 to	 perpetuate	 rather	 than	 address	 the	suffering	of	victims.		More	recently	in	his	work	The	Color	of	Our	Shame:	Race	and	Justice	in	Our	
Time,	 alluded	 to	 above,	 Christopher	 Lebron	 has	 shown	 how	 Williams’s																																																									75	Ibid.:	93.	76	Ibid.:	222.	77	Williams’s	claim	for	the	‘heteronomy’	of	shame	–	shame	as	produced	through	situated	relations	and	 often	 through	 non-intentional	 acts	 –	 shares	 a	 strange	 affinity	 with	 Brian	 Massumi’s	argument,	noted	above,	for	the	autonomy	of	affect	where	all	affects	including	shame	are	seen	to	be	 triggered	 independently	 of	 intentional	 objects.	 Both	 accounts	 privilege	 situated,	 embodied	subjects	 (potentially	 narcissistic	 subjects	 also),	 whilst	 challenging	 the	 primacy	 of	 a	 rationally	directed	conception	of	human	agency.	
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recuperation	of	 shame’s	modernity	might	apply	 to	 the	 specific	 circumstance	of	race	 in	 America.	Whilst	 we	might	 easily	 imagine	 shame	 attaching	 itself	 to	 the	racialized	 subject	 –	 the	 subject	 known	 according	 to	 her	 race	 –	 Lebron’s	 study	seeks	 to	 transfer	 this	 phenomenological	 or	 psychological	 fact	 into	 a	 kind	 of	intellectual	method:	shame	is	a	way	to	stipulate	the	difference	between	what	is	and	what	potentially	might	be	the	case	within	a	given	formal	system	of	justice.	In	other	words,	instead	of	as	we	might	expect	appealing	to	the	neutrality	of	the	law	(the	 idea	 that	 everyone	 is	 equal	 before	 the	 law)	 as	 a	 militation	 against	 the	determination	 of	 character	 on	 racial	 grounds,	 Lebron	 suggests,	 following	 a	Williams-like	 argument,	 that	 we	 use	 the	 question	 of	 character	 and	 shame	 in	order	to	make	sure	the	law	functions.	Like	Williams,	he	offers	critique	of	Kantian	systems	of	morality,	specifically	John	Rawls’s	distributive	theory	of	justice	which	models	fairness	in	strategic	ignorance	of	historical	conditions	of	subjectivity.	The	problem	with	Rawls’s	formal	model	is	that	although	by	its	light	it	is	unreasonable	to	defend	slavery	–and	this,	says	Lebron,	is	in	accordance	with	the	contemporary	practice	 and	 attitude	 of	 most	 law-abiding	 American	 citizens–	 it	 is	 not	unreasonable	 to	 ignore	 the	 effects	 of	 slavery.	 This	 ‘reasonable	 ignorance’,	 and	the	problem	it	 infers,	cannot	be	addressed	according	 to	a	 further	appeal	 to	 the	law	–	by	a	subscription	to	a	rule	of	distribution	however	stringent	–	but	only	by	returning	us	 to	 the	ethics	of	 shame.	Such	an	ethics	 ‘implicates	us	 in	coming	up	short	on	our	own	account,	on	account	of	principles	and	standards	for	which	we	have	expressed	a	prior	standing	preference’.78	In	other	words,	shame	isolates	the	difference	 between	 the	 formality	 of	 the	 law	 to	 which	 we	 adhere	 and	 the	fulfilment	 of	 social	 justice	 which	 the	 law	 might	 possibly	 permit.	 Instead	 of	eradicating	 shame,	 then,	 Lebron	wants	 to	 generalize	 it	 and	 put	 it	 to	work:	 all	Americans	should	be	ashamed;	which,	in	the	specific	case,	is	to	say	all	Americans	should	be	racialized	insofar	as	they	have	not	actualized	the	equality	written	into	their	law.			 Those	 writing	 in	 a	 critical	 postcolonial	 perspective	 will	 find	 little	 to	surprise	 them	 in	 Lebron’s	 argument,	 except	 perhaps	 his	 philosopher’s	 faith	 in	the	law’s	ultimate	consistency.	For	Timothy	Bewes	in	his	2011	study	The	Event	of	
Postcolonial	Shame,	the	historical	play	of	identity	and	difference	is	the	organizing																																																									78	Lebron,	Op.	cit.:	22.		
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principle	of	both	shame	and	colonialism,	extending	to	all	scholarly	ethnographies	and	underlying	too	the	production	and	persistence	of	race,	which	interrupts	the	purely	 formal	value	of	 the	 law.79	Whereas	 for	Lebron	shame	 is	a	goad	working	within	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 law,	 as	 a	 means	 of	 realizing	 its	 formal	 promise	 of	equality,	 for	Bewes	shame	can	only	produce	the	rupture	of	 form	and	content.80	Through	shame	–	in	the	‘event’	of	shame	–	all	formal	strategies	of	representation	are	 rendered	 inadequate.	 It	 is	 telling	 that	 for	 Bewes,	 ‘shame	 is	 an	 event	 of	writing’. 81 	Pointing	 both	 to	 Holocaust	 testimony	 and	 to	 contemporary	postcolonial	literature	he	says	that	we	don’t	simply	write	about	shameful	scenes	that	once	happened,	or	happened	over	there,	giving	them	a	frame	and	a	salutary	meaning	which	can	be	represented	here	and	now:	rather	we	encounter	shame	by	and	through	writing	as	the	inadequacy	of	the	frame	and	the	collapse	of	meaning.	It’s	 not	 simply	 that	 the	 content	 of	 the	 experience	 being	 described	 exceeds	 the	form	of	its	description	(those	unspeakable	horrors	etc.),	but	rather	that	through	this	 excess	 shame	 is	 communicated. 82 	Shame	 is	 an	 event	 which	 produces	between	the	writer-subject	and	her	object	the	thought	of	the	absence	of	form.83	This	 is	 an	 important	 shift,	 from	 content	 to	 form,	 because	 it	 reminds	 us,	 in	 the	first	place,	 that	the	shame	of	a	destitute	other	must	rebound	upon	her	witness,	and	in	the	second	place,	because	it	reveals	at	the	heart	of	the	conceit	of	formally	objectifying	 experience	 –	 doing	 justice	 to	 things	 –	 lies	 an	 unredeemable	subjectivity	and	a	perspective	founded	on	exclusion	and	ignorance.			 Bewes’s	reading	of	shame	as	a	formal	concern,	especially	pertinent	for	the	ethnographic	 quandaries	 of	 postcoloniality,	 returns	 us	 to	 the	 obscure	 terms	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	which	 constitute	 the	 field	of	 representation.	Given	 this	emphasis	on	the	political	margins	of	form,	the	point	at	which	it	breaks	down,	we	might	suggest	that	he	underplays	the	role	of	sex	and	sexuality	here,	especially	as	questions	concerning	the	communicability	of	lived	experience	and	the	instability	of	 social	 relations	 across	 political	 boundaries	 often	 come	 to	 express	 their	irresolution	through	the	ambiguity	of	sex.	Queer	theory’s	formative	engagement																																																									79	Timothy	Bewes,	The	Event	of	Postcolonial	Shame.	(Princeton,	New	Jersey,	Princeton	University	Press:	2011):	165-166.	80	Ibid.:	20.	81	Ibid.:	15.	82	Ibid.:	39.	83	Ibid.:	46.	
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with	 shame	 comes	 through	 Sedgwick’s	 essay	 ‘Shame,	 Theatricality	 and	 Queer	Performativity’	 in	 which	 she	 characterizes	 its	 double	 movement,	 ‘painful	individuation’	 and	 ‘uncontrollable	 relationality’,	 as,	 for	 queer	 people,	 the	 first	structuring	fact	of	identity	–	identity	however	without	the	secure	standing	of	an	essence.84	In	broader	social	terms,	queer	shame	has	come	to	query	the	politics	of	gay	pride	(it	is	‘pride’s	otherwise’	in	Haperin’s	language)	where	pride	is	seen	to	appeal	 for	 legitimation	 to	 the	 political	 centre,	 and	 to	 be	 tending,	 in	 this	 way,	towards	assimilation	within	normative	power	structures.	Shame	is	productive	in	Sedgwick’s	unapologetically	 literary	sensibility,	when	there	exists	a	recognition	that	accompanying	its	pain	is	the	possibility	opened-up	by	non-assimilation	and	by	the	excitement	of	unsanctioned	pleasures.	This	 is	no	resting	place,	however,	since,	 even	 allowing	 for	 shame’s	 queer	 pleasure,	 the	 politics	 of	 shaming,	 the	asymmetric	 power	 relations	 shame	 too	 often	 implies,	 persist.	 The	 tension	between	 queer	 and	 more	 conventional	 political	 readings	 of	 shame	 is	 well	represented	in	the	anthology	Gay	Shame,	edited	by	David	M.	Halperin	and	Valerie	Traub.85	This	 volume	 risks	 becoming	 exemplary	 for	 how	 it	 showcases	 its	 own	shame	as	an	institutionally	sanctioned	writing	project.	Not	only	does	it	advertise	its	 own	 shortcomings	 and	 dismemberments	 (those	 writers	 who	 refused	 on	political	grounds	to	be	included	in	the	publication)	but	the	terms	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	become	quite	uncertain	as	particular	contributors	insist	on	expressing	within	 the	 work	 their	 exception	 from	 it.	 As	 the	 editors	 explain	 in	 the	Introduction,	they	had	conceived	the	original	academic	conference	‘in	such	a	way	as	to	make	the	prospect	of	publishing	the	proceedings	unlikely,	if	not	impossible’,	for	reasons	of	scope	and	inclusivity:	the	ambition	to	connect	queer	scholarship	to	broad	 social	 movements,	 and	 to	 encourage	 the	 involvement	 of	 different	 non-academic	groups	including	sex-workers	and	local	activists.86	The	feeling	that	we	are	 indeed	reading	writing	 that	 should	have	been	 impossible,	 a	 form	annulling	itself	 in	 the	event	–	 in	 this	 case	 the	event	of	 the	original	 conference	–	emerges	most	obviously	through	two	pieces	included	in	the	volume	which	are	almost	not																																																									84	Eve	 Kosofsky	 Sedgwick,	 ‘Shame,	 Theatricality,	 and	 Queer	 Performativity:	 Henry	 James’s	The	
Art	of	the	Novel’	 in	Touching	Feeling:	Affect,	Pedagogy,	Performativity	(London	&	Durham,	Duke	University	Press,	2003:	35-66):	37.	85	David	 M.	 Halperin	 &	 Valerie	 Traub	 (eds.),	 Gay	 Shame.	 (Chicago,	 The	 University	 of	 Chicago	Press,	2009)	86	Ibid.:5.	
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there.	The	 first	 is	 entitled	 ‘An	Open	Letter	 to	Douglas	Crimp’	 (not	an	academic	paper)	 by	 Lawrence	 La	 Fountain-Stokes,	 quoted	 in	 full	 in	 the	 editors’	introduction.	 La	 Foutain-Stokes	 addresses	 Crimp’s	 reading	 of	 Andy	 Warhol’s	‘Screen	 Test	 #2’	 in	 which	 the	 drag	 queen	 Mario	 Montez	 is	 objectified	 and	humiliated.	 For	 Crimp,	 Warhol’s	 film	 is	 not	 simply	 voyeuristic	 but	 ‘shows	 a	performer	in	the	moment	of	being	exposed’;	in	Mario’s	‘irresistible,	resplendent	vulnerability’	 (73)	we	witness	 his	 shame,	 but	 ‘a	 shame	 that	we	 accept	 as	 also	ours,	but	curiously	ours	alone’.87		The	erotics	of	this	contagion	are	rebuked	by	La	Fountain-Stokes	 in	 that	 its	 abject	heroism	 for	 shame	entirely	neglects,	 renders	invisible,	Mario	Montez’s	 race.	Does	 it	matter	 that	 it	 is	a	non-white	body	being	shamed?	And	who	are	we	to	witness,	and	narcissistically	appropriate,	this	shame	for	ourselves,	in	our	strange	isolation?	Are	we	inevitably	white,	as	white	as	Andy	Warhol?	 As	 a	 corrective	 to	 such	 assumptions,	 La	 Fountain-Stokes	 invokes	 the	racially	 alert	 and	 consciousness-raising	 shame	 writing	 of	 Frantz	 Fanon	 and	Audre	 Lorde,	 among	 others,	 and	 stipulates	 the	 specificity	 of	 Munoz’s	 identity	(performative	 or	 not)	 as	 a	 queer	 Puerto	 Rican.	 The	 second	 nearly-absent	contribution	 is	 that	of	Leo	Bersani	who	 in	his	 less-than-a-page	contribution,	as	well	as	expressing	his	 ‘disappointment’	with	the	conference,	 takes	the	opposite	view	from	La	Fountain-Stokes.	For	Bersani,	Crimp’s	paper	was	the	only	genuine	attempt	to	consider	shame	in	 its	 ‘psychic	dimensions’.	For	too	many,	he	writes,	the	politically	correct	interpretation	offers	itself:	shame	is	imposed	from	without	by	 ‘evil	 heterosexism’	which	 it	 is	 in	 all	 our	 interests,	 and	 all	 our	 pleasures,	 to	overcome.	88		There	 is	 something	 unsettled	 about	 the	 conception	 of	 shame	 which	emerges	 from	 this	 debate:	 marking	 on	 one	 side	 the	 productivity	 of	 non-assimilation	in	the	lives	of	queer	subjects	and	on	the	other	the	effect	of	political	reduction	and	oppression	along	the	lines	of	race.	This	conflict	is	further	explored	by	Judith	Halberstam,	who	attended	the	conference,	but,	refusing	publication	of	her	 paper	 within	 the	 volume,	 professes	 ‘gay	 shame’	 an	 anachronistic	 idea.	Halberstam	 suspects	 that	 ‘shame’	 prefers	 white	 male	 subjects	 abjecting																																																									87	Douglas	Crimp,	‘Mario	Montez,	For	Shame’	in	Gay	Shame	Edited	by	David	M.	Halperin	&	Valerie	Traub.	(Chicago,	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2009:	63-75):	73.	88	Leo	 Bersani,’Excluding	 Shame’	 in	 Gay	 Shame	Edited	 by	 David	 M.	 Halperin	 &	 Valerie	 Traub.	(Chicago,	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2009:	176-177):	176.	
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themselves	 before	 history;	 it	 is,	 she	 suggests,	 the	 feeling	 of	 castration,	 a	powerlessness	 akin	 to	 feeling	 feminized	 against	 their	 will	 which	 excites	 the	authority	 of	white	 gay	 shame.89	This	means,	 for	Halberstam,	 the	 spectre	 of	 the	shamed	 other	 (non-white,	 non-male)	means	 that	 questions	 of	 race	 necessarily	intersect	with	those	of	sex	and	gender.		This	 position	 resonates	 with	 Biddle’s	 point,	 mentioned	 above,	 about	anthropology	and	 the	 taboo	on	 looking	–	 the	 transgression	of	crossing	borders	which,	 she	 remarks,	 is	 also	 always	 sexualized. 90 		 Biddle	 adds	 that	 when	anthropology	 is	 shown	 up	 or	 shamed	 in	 this	 way,	 shown	 up	 to	 be	 less	 than	objective,	the	fact	that	the	‘best	known	anthropological	practitioner	is	a	woman’	is	 by	 no	means	 adventitious:	 ‘infamous	 indeed	 is	 Margaret	 Mead,	 with	 all	 the	sexual	 and	 sexist	 undertones	 implied;	 conjoined	 as	 she	 and	 her	 work	 have	become	where	the	travel,	the	exotic	places,	her	various	husbands	and	lovers	and	sex	itself,	metonymically	all	unite’.91	It	is	the	ideological	canard	of	‘Woman’	here	who	is	at	once	shameless	enough	to	dare	to	look,	and	crippled	by	shame,	othered	by	 her	 involvement	 in	 a	 foreign	 element.	 Shamed	 or	 shameless,	 Mead,	 in	 this	view,	is	not	given	the	license	granted	to	gay	white	men	of	experimenting	with	the	erotics	of	contagion.	Halberstam	argues	 that	 ‘shame	for	women,	and	shame	for	people	 of	 color	 plays	 out	 in	 different	 ways	 and	 creates	 different	 modes	 of	abjection,	 marginalization,	 and	 self-abnegation;	 it	 also	 leads	 to	 very	 different	political	strategies’:	these,	she	concludes,	are	structural	rather	than	ego-based.92	The	details	of	this	politics	are	not	spelt	out,	though	it	is	clear	that	Halberstam	is	unhappy	with	the	diversity	and	extent	of	the	shame	archive	as	it	currently	exists.		Jessica	 Berman	 has	 wondered	 recently	 asked	 ‘Is	 the	 Trans	 in	Transnational	 the	Trans	 in	Transgender?’	 concluding	 that	 the	 comparison	 is	 at	least	 worth	 making	 if	 bodies	 crossing	 borders	 are	 also,	 necessarily,	 bodies	reconfigured.93	The	further	question,	one	which	emerges	in	trans-sex	and	trans-gender	discourse	too,	is	how	these	bodies	get	reconfigured	and	whether	they	are																																																									89	Judith	Halberstam,	 ‘Shame	and	White	Gay	Masculinity’	 in	Social	Text	Vol	23.	Nos.	 3-4	 (2005:	219-234):	226.	90	Biddle,	Op.	cit.:	232-233.	91	Ibid.	92	Halberstam,	Op.	cit.:	223.	93 	Jessica	 Berman,	 ‘Is	 the	 Trans	 in	 Transnational	 the	 Trans	 in	 Transgender?’	 in	
Modernism/modernity	Vol.	24.,	No.	2	(2017:	217-244).		
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readable	 in	 their	 complexity	 as	 such?	 If,	 in	 one	 story,	 the	white	man	 ventures	abroad,	encountering	 there	 the	queer,	painful	excitement	of	castration,	 then,	 in	another	story,	it	is	up	to	the	not-(white)man	to	interrupt	that	journey	and	put	an	end	to	the	perennial	Fort	Da!	of	a	man	playing	with	his	penis.	A	woman	is	not	a	man,	 but,	 as	 Simone	 de	 Beauvoir	 once	 reminded	 us,	 neither	 is	 she	 a	 eunuch;	rather	she	is	a	creature	in	and	of	transition:	occupying,	reading,	writing,	which	is	to	 say	 organizing,	 the	 spaces	 in	 between.94		 If,	 in	 one	 story,	 ours	 is	 the	 age	 of	shame,	in	another	story,	according	to	Halberstam,	it	might	yet	become	the	age	of	shame	giving	way	to	something	else.		
This	Book	This	 book	 does	 not	 propose	 to	 formulate	 shame	 as	 a	 single	 idea	 or	 concept	 –	hence	 the	 diversity	 of	 theoretical	 approaches	 to	 the	 topic	 –	 though	 it	 does	contend,	 as	 the	 foregoing	 account	 of	 overlapping	 discourses	 suggests,	 that,	 for	good	or	ill,	shame	has	come	to	bear	considerable	cultural	weight	in	the	modern	period.	 	 It	connects	shame	to	 the	character	of	 the	writing	self	 representing	her	own	 failure	 to	 write;	 to	 the	 blurring	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	 legal	 and	psychological	 conceptions	 of	 guilt,	 and	 to	 various	 modern	 critical	 projects	 –	postcolonial	and	feminist	–	which	insist	on	the	historical	character	of	the	law	and	the	violent	imperatives	of	looking	and	framing	and	reproducing	knowledge.	The	essays,	collected	in	this	volume,	organized	in	rough	chronological	order,	provide	something	of	 a	 genealogy	of	 shame’s	modernity,	 as	 it	 infiltrates	 the	practice	of	writing:	beginning	with		Montaigne	and	Shakespeare,	moving	through	Rousseau	and	 into	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 Because	 shame	 troubles	 the	 object	 of	institutional	 knowledge,	 and	 because	 the	 writers	 writing	 here	 are	 working	 in	some	 form	within	 American	 or	 European	 institutions,	we	 end	with	 a	 series	 of	considerations	of	the	university,	and	academic	writing	as	it	is	practiced	today.			
																																																									94	Famously,	de	Beauvoir	writes,	 ‘One	 is	not	born,	but	 rather	becomes,	a	woman.	No	biological,	psychological,	or	economic	fate	determines	the	figure	that	the	human	female	presents	in	society;	it	is	civilization	as	a	whole	that	produces	this	creature,	intermediate	between	male	and	eunuch,	which	is	described	as	feminine.’	(Simone	de	Beauvoir,	The	Second	Sex.	Translated	and	Edited	by	H.M.	Parshley	(Harmondsworth,	Middlesex,	Penguin	Books:	1987[1949]):	295.	
